On April 2, while Donald Trump was madly attacking the world, senior leaders of the People’s Liberation Army (the Chinese army), dressed in camouflage uniforms and armed with peaks, rode the ground during a voluntary reforestation trip in Beijing. In this activity, which has been carried out since the 1980s, the main leaders of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC, the ultimate authority over the armed forces), and other members of the Communist Party were appointed. Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, he has never been without a member of the military leadership. This year was different. They continue to follow the volatile investigations into Chinese politics, pointing to the absence of General He Weidong, the second in command of the English Premier League.
He, then second vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and one of 24 members of the Politburo, the Communist Party’s main organ of power, last appeared in public on March 11. Shortly before that, a speech was made about the need to deepen the fight against corruption in the ranks of the English Premier League. He was a man close to Xi, who put him in charge of the forces three years ago. According to the Pentagon, she played a key role in planning real-world maneuvers around Taiwan after Nancy Pelosi, then Speaker of the US House of Representatives, angered China with a visit to Taipei in August 2022.
Spending too much time focusing was an indicator that something was wrong. All you have to do is wait. On October 17, the Ministry of Defense announced the expulsion of the party and armed forces affiliated with He and other senior officials accused of corruption. He has officially become a destitute mayor-general since the end of Mao Zedong’s term in 1976. His coup, along with other officers, was just another link in a series of denudations that have intensified since 2023 with an ever-similar dynamic: first, the orders disappear from public life; Weeks or months later, the government announces the opening of an investigation into corruption and expels the party amid accusations of serious behavioral violations.
Something is changing in the Premier League, but nothing is well known. Many analysts point to Xi’s move to end disparate factions within the armed forces, consolidate his control over the escalation promotion system, and ensure the future loyalty of incoming generals.
This thesis is defended by Lin Yingyu, an assistant professor at Tamkang University (Taiwan), who specializes in the capabilities of the Chinese army. The Chinese president wanted to “reset the system” by specifically working on the political work management of the Central Military Commission, the body responsible for supervising the appointments of new generals. “Under the rubric of corruption he intended to destroy a group (…) that would not always be willing to follow his orders,” he commented by phone from Taiwan.
“It is strange that the new military officers who fell into disgrace were so Tigers “This purge also raises questions about Xi’s control over the military,” Masaaki Yatsuzuka, a principal researcher at Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies, wrote in a recent article for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
Many of these generals were associated with the elite 31st Army Group, and were considered close to Xi, with whom he had worked since his days as a local leader. They came up after careful monitoring by the actor. “It is not clear whether his downfall signals a change in trust between Xi and the military, or an increasingly fierce power struggle within the military,” Yatsuzuka admits.
The first salvos of the campaign launched by Xi Jinping when he took over the country’s leadership – under which millions of civil servants at all levels were investigated – are invaluable in projecting an image of discipline and cleansing the party’s reputation. During that initial phase, heavy army forces fell, and then stood as a stronghold with large amounts of autonomy and complex networks formed during the eras of Jiang Zeming and Hu Jintao. However, the attack has taken on a new direction since Xi was reinstated for a third term: now it also falls on the men he trusts. According to a Bloomberg investigation, 14 of the 79 generals who rose under their command have disappeared or been investigated in recent years. To find parallels with the situation, we have to go back to the 1970s.
This discipline campaign climbed through the military hierarchy, from strategic units to the pinnacle of military power. The sequence of destitutions has been tracking an upward streak since the sudden cessation, in the summer of 2023, of Li Yue Zhao and Xu Zhongbo, the main commandos of the Koheits Force, charged with controlling the Asian power’s nuclear arsenal. This incident was the beginning of the escalation that intensified in 2024 with the expulsion of former Defense Minister Li Changfu (he stopped months ago, only half a year after his appointment) and his predecessor Wei Fenghe from the party.
The attack continued until 2025, reaching an unprecedented level. He Weidong became the first active vice chairman to be expelled from the top of the Central Military Commission since the Cultural Revolution, and in the third half he has fallen into disgrace since the current committee took office three years ago. The first was Li Shangfu himself, in October 2023; He succeeded Miao Hua, director of the Political Work Department, in November 2024. Miao, who until then was considered an ally of the Chinese representative, was one of the new generals whose departure from the party was made official last month.
Among the remaining cesados there are at all. From He Hongjun, Miao’s deputy in the administration specifically charged with ensuring loyalty to the Party within the army, to Wang Hubin, the former commander of the Kohetz force. Meanwhile, Zhang Xingmin, head of the Premier League’s disciplinary body, replaced He in his position at CMC. But the movements left the top of the organization vacant, with only members other than the president and vice-presidents.
The strategic nature of the Kohetz force – created in 2015 and a key unit of Xi’s military modernization – has fueled suspicions that part of the uncovered corruption network could trace its origins back into its ranks. The concentration of takeover contracts, silo management and launches, and the expansion of new bases have provided opportunities for influence escaping and money transfer.
Lin Yingyu, of Tamkang University, believes that with the new structure, Xi also intends to ensure that the appointments of new generals are made up of relevant people, so that when he retires or gives up his official positions as secretary-general, president of the country or chairman of the Central Military Commission, the military establishment will remain under his control. Xi is, after all, the supreme leader of the armed forces in a country where Mao declared decades ago: “Political power is born of the law of arms.” As Professor Lin put it: “If you control the English Premier League, it means you can control Chinese politics.”
The Premier League is, above all, the army of the Chinese Communist Party. Their soldiers swear loyalty to the party, of which they are members, and take orders from Xi, as leader and president. The party’s editorial stated, “The army bears arms, is the armed group charged with carrying out the party’s political tasks, and constitutes a solid foundation for protecting our red regime and defending national dignity.” English Premier League Diaries The charges against the “despicable” behavior of the new “traitorous” generals stopped in October. “The more you fight corruption, the stronger, purer and more effective the Premier League becomes in the fight,” he continues.
General Zhang Yuxia, another vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, said in an article that the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) aims to enhance the military’s capabilities. She also promised to take action against “false loyalty” and “men with two men,” and demanded the elimination of “toxic influences and persistent problems.”
Zhang, China’s mayor-general and also a Politburo member, was the protagonist in the chronicles of that April morning on which top commandos went out in uniform to reforest Beijing’s outskirts. “After more than an hour of hard work, they planted more than 800 trees,” Xinhua admitted. The note doesn’t say anything about who is missing.
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