
Iraq has fallen into oblivion in the international press. Once the Islamic State (ISIS) was defeated, the humanitarian and social devastation caused by the US occupation and the subsequent sectarian civil war overshadowed the series of conflicts that haunt the Middle East (Syria, Gaza, Iran…). Thus, the withdrawal of US forces that began last summer, and the legislative elections on Tuesday, passed almost unnoticed. Both have the potential to distance Iraq from the Iranian network of influence.
After two long decades of intermittent presence in Iraq, the United States agreed with the Baghdad government to end the international coalition against ISIS, with the exception of a small group of advisors and trainers. The political and security implications of this measure made it a central issue in the election campaign. The Shiite parties allied with Iran, which have been pushing for this for some time, claim that this is a victory for national sovereignty and talk about “the end of the occupation.” The more nationalist formations, especially the Sunnis, fear renewed violence if the pro-Iranian militias try to impose their power.
Since the US invasion in 2003, the Islamic Republic of Iran has extended its influence over neighboring Iraq far beyond historical, cultural and religious ties. His support for Shiite parties and militias (the majority branch of Islam in both countries) was largely a sign of Iraq’s political future. Although its control has diminished since the United States assassinated General Qassem Soleimani five years ago (who served as the link and glue with these groups), it still retains support, which has been reassessed by the loss of its pawns (Agents) in the rest of the Middle East countries.
The war in Gaza served as a pretext for Israel to weaken the capabilities of the Tehran-sponsored militia network in the region (the so-called axis of resistance). In addition to eliminating the Palestinian Hamas movement (responsible for the October 7, 2023 attack), it has inflicted severe damage on Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, members of the Revolutionary Guard inside Syria, and even within Iran itself, the country whose nuclear facilities ended up being bombed last June in a humiliating operation.
The Iraqi allies of the Islamic Republic are the only ones who have remained on the sidelines of the conflict by remaining out of their supporters’ conflict with Israel. This action was supported by Tehran, but dictated by pressure from the government in Baghdad (always in a difficult balance between Iran and the United States) and, above all, by the militias’ fear of Israeli or American response and internal backlash. Iraqis are tired of political tensions and have begun to reject new foreign entanglements. This climate also frames the division of the Shiite factions in the government coalition in the face of the Prime Minister’s efforts, after agreeing on the departure of American forces, to dismantle the armed groups (which justified their presence in the fight against the “occupiers”).
In fact, in these elections, many Shiite groups that were under Tehran’s rule presented opposition lists. Hence the additional interest in the electoral event, the outcome of which will reveal the extent to which the Iranian president maintains his weight. The Iraqi militias are the last pawn standing. Even if opinion polls reduce its support, Iran will not give up continuing to intervene in a country that it considers part of its sphere of influence, but that will be more costly and will make it difficult for it to maintain the supply route to its allies in Syria and Lebanon.