The number of deaths at the hands of Rio de Janeiro police over 28 years represents 15% of all intentional violent deaths in the state in that period. There are 25,283 out of a total of 170,338 people. The survey he conducted Bound With data from the ISP (Institute of Public Security) it takes into account the historical series from January 1998 to September 2025.
This year’s data does not yet include the 117 deaths in the massive operation on October 28, the deadliest operation in history – and counting the four police officers, there were 121 deaths.
Rio de Janeiro currently ranks third in terms of absolute deaths at the hands of police officers and seventh in terms of deaths per 100,000 population. We have seen a decline in police fatalities in recent years, but experts point out that given the proportional rate, Rio would be expected to lag behind much smaller states, such as Amapa, Sergipe and Mato Grosso, where a small difference can carry more weight.
The last 10 years have been Rio’s deadliest, with 11,550 deaths caused by agents between 2015 and 2024, or 1,155 annually.
In terms of size, the number exceeds all deaths caused by police in the United States in the same period, which amounted to 10,424, according to a poll conducted by the Washington Post based on official sources and its own investigation. The country’s population is 20 times larger than the population of the state of Rio de Janeiro.
“The United States is a very big country,” says economist Joana Monteiro, professor at FGV and researcher in the field of public security. “So, even compared to this country, which has seen many police violence scandals, (our number) is higher. In Brazil we have learned to naturalize this number, but when I say this to a foreigner who works in the security field, everyone is shocked.”
In the same 10-year period, 615 police officers in Rio de Janeiro died in on-duty and off-duty conflict situations, according to a report by the Justice Department — that’s the highest number in the country, even though Rio has the third-largest population among the states. São Paulo’s population is more than twice that of Rio de Janeiro, and it recorded 463 agent deaths in the same period.
A record 1,814 deaths at the hands of Rio police in 2019 made the company the most violent in the country in absolute numbers, according to the annual survey conducted by the FBSP (Brazilian Forum for Public Security). With 10 deaths per 100,000 population, the state was second only to Amapa, where the 121 deaths represented a rate of 14 per 100,000. In comparison, the overall rate in Brazil was 3 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, and in São Paulo it was 2 per 100,000 inhabitants.
The escalation of conflicts at that time led, in the same year, to the initiation of the ADPF das Favelas – claiming non-compliance with the Fundamental Principles – before the STF (Federal Supreme Court). Since 2020, the Supreme Court has implemented changes in the structure of the security forces and in the standards and procedures for the use of police force in communities in Rio.
In the following years, the total number of deaths at the hands of police in the state decreased, a trend that was partly justified by the Afghan Democratic Front, according to entities such as GENIE (New Offenses Study Group) at the Federal University of Fluminense and the FBSP.
The administration of Governor Claudio Castro (PL) has been responsible for three of the four most deadly operations in the capital’s urban area since January 2007. In addition to the incursion into the Penha and Alemão complexes on the 28th, Castro was at the head of the government during the massacres in Jacarezinho (2021) and Villa Cruzeiro (2022). These operations left 28 and 23 casualties, respectively.
While human rights organizations classify the latest operation as a massacre, the state government denies that any executions took place, and claims that the operation was key to weakening the Red Leadership in its core region.
Responding to the Minister of Special Forces, Alexandre de Moraes, the rapporteur of the Afghan People’s Defense Forces in Favelas, Castro stated that the operation respected the rules set forth in the trial of the matter and that it was not an ordinary one, “but to confront a highly organized organization, heavily armed and with a history of violent resistance”, highlighting that the disputes between the CV and the rival factions had sparked an arms race with the possession of weapons of war.
For those who work in the slums of the capital’s urban area, a hotbed of killing, the fear is that the outcome of the latest raids, with a higher-than-usual number of police officers killed, will only increase the carnage. “With the four police officers who died and the one who ended up losing his leg, what comes back?” asks Public Defender Christian Xavier.
“Because we know that whenever a police officer is killed, the retaliation is greater, and it is accelerating. It is also frightening that the governor continues to announce that there are ten more operations that will be conducted and that Jacarepagua will resume.”
For the defender, the formula used for decades is wrong. “If you don’t create alternatives in communities, if you don’t re-urbanize, it is clear that this security project, the same way it has worked for 30 years, will have no impact. If I don’t change the ingredients, the cake will always be the same.”
“We have to change the way we do it. Because no matter how many people say (that the polls show approval for the operation), I am sure that no one is satisfied with living in a city where people are deliberately killed, whether by one side or the other. No one wants to live in a city like that.”
This is the same feeling of exhaustion shown by retired Civil Police Commander Vinicius George. “In 30 years, we have killed at least 30,000 and at least 3,000 of our own people have died. And nothing has improved in that period. On the contrary. If killing and death had led to it, it would have worked already. But it has not. It is a spiral of violence, an arms race. Are we going to insist on that?” he grumbled.
Although the data available from the ISP covers the last 28 years, he says he is satisfied with the approximate numbers he cited. “In order to improve, the first thing is not to think about what went wrong. In terms of what to do, we have to trial and error. It worked, we continue. It wasn’t good, we are improving. It went wrong, and we changed course.”
About The Author
