When most observers focus on the trade war, technology sanctions, or diplomacy, something deeper is happening: the return of China’s geoeconomic strategy that goes beyond factories and tariffs, and is woven into the fabric of global relations.
With the approval of its 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) – Beijing is not only reaffirming its ambition for leadership in technology, but launching a global offensive in the field of “connectivity”, that network of infrastructures, linkages, capital flows and soft power that is no longer limited to military geography but the ability to weave the world.
In the foreground is the United States, with its own network of alliances, supply chains and technology agreements: the competition plays out on the map of invisible communications.
What does the fifteenth five-year plan contain and what is its importance?
The document represents a new phase of industrial and technological modernization. Some of its most important axes include the priority of modernization of the productive system, technological independence as a strategic pillar, dual circulation (internal and external market) and communication with the outside with selective openness. By increasing its commitment to “new good factors of production,” China is also redesigning the physical and digital paths to global power.
Technological independence is turning into an instrument of sovereignty: chips, semiconductors, advanced materials and biotechnology become priority areas. “External connectivity” includes data cables, logistics nodes, ports, satellites, and emerging financial centers. The Fifteenth Plan is not so much an economic program as a geostrategic road map.
Connectography as a battlefield
The term “connectivity” (Parag Khanna, 2017) describes a world in which power is no longer measured by borders, but by networks. On that map, the two superpowers – China and the United States – confront each other over “who connects the world and how.” China is making this clear through its Belt and Road Initiative, a network of physical and digital infrastructure that crisscrosses Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The United States responds by establishing technology alliances (such as the Chip 4 Alliance or the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment) and by imposing restrictions on the transfer of sensitive technology.
Each fiber optic cable, port or rail track is a piece of panel. China seeks to create a closed and effective system. The United States seeks to keep standards of global communication and governance open. The conflict is not territorial, but topological.
New markets become spaces of contention. Beijing offers investment and technology in exchange for aligning standards and value chains; Washington proposes alliances based on finance, energy and digital security. Both models seek to shape the economic structure of the Global South.
The Trump-Xi factor: The Busan meeting and its aftermath
The meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping confirmed that competition is no longer limited to trade. Washington agreed to reduce customs duties and stop sanctions on technology exports, while Beijing agreed to ease controls on rare earth elements, resume agricultural imports and cooperate in controlling fentanyl.
However, what was important was the mutual recognition that the conflict was moving into the area of strategic connectivity: semiconductors, energy, submarine cables, artificial intelligence, and international finance. Communication has been standardized as the new frontier of power.
As the Financial Times noted, “The real outcome of the Busan meeting is the implicit recognition that neither the United States can isolate China, nor China can overcome the Western order; both need to coexist in a network that they are trying to redesign to their advantage.”
Implications for Argentina and Latin America
Competition between powers opens opportunities for investment and technology transfer and risks of dependency and loss of independence.
In this context, Besant’s statements were strong: “We do not want another failed state or a Chinese-led state in Latin America. Stabilizing Argentina is a priority for the United States.” This phrase reveals Washington’s strategic tone: it is not just about economic aid, it is about geopolitical containment, in an attempt to limit Beijing’s credit and infrastructure influence. Network diplomacy requires a foreign policy capable of balancing interests and preventing Sino-American competition from translating into technological or financial dependence.
conclusion
The 15th Five-Year Plan is not a bureaucratic document: it is a declaration of intent about how the world will be reshaped in the coming decades for the Asian country.
The Trump-Xi meeting showed that competition can coexist with interdependence, and that both countries seek to redesign the global network rather than destroy it. In this context, Latin America faces a dilemma: to be a sovereign communication space or a dependent node in foreign networks.
For Argentine, the dilemma is more pressing: deciding whether he wants to become an actor or stage actor. Because in the twenty-first century, power is not measured by occupied territories, but by networks under control. Whoever masters communication in the twenty-first century will dominate the future.
