On November 14, 1975, five days after Moroccan King Hassan II concluded the Green March, the so-called Tripartite Agreement was signed in Madrid, under which Spain ceded the administration of Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania and committed to giving up its fifty-third territory before February 28, 1976.
With the signing of the “Declaration of Principles between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania regarding Western Sahara”, the Spanish government abandoned its commitment to the United Nations to proceed with a self-determination referendum in this region, which should have taken place in the first half of 1975, and which was paralyzed by the appeal to the International Court of Justice promoted by Morocco.
In the document signed by then Prime Minister Carlos Arias Navarro, Spain ratified “its decision to end colonialism in the territory of Western Sahara, and to put an end to the responsibilities and powers it enjoys over the aforementioned territory as an administrative authority.”
Likewise, Spain pledged to move forward “immediately with the establishment of an interim administration in the territory in which Morocco and Mauritania will participate, in cooperation with YEMA, the association created by the Spanish authorities in 1967 to assist in the administration,” and to which all “responsibilities and powers” will transfer.
As a result, it was decided to appoint “two deputy governors, at the suggestion of Morocco and Mauritania, to assist the governor-general of the region in his duties” and it was stipulated that “the end of the Spanish presence in the region will take place once and for all before February 28, 1976”, that is, after only three and a half months.
The most controversial point in the Joint Declaration is the third point: “The opinion of the Sahrawi population, expressed through YAMA, will be respected.” Here, experts agree to denounce that the Sahrawis were never asked what they wanted, something that remains true to this day, because despite the commitment to hold a self-determination referendum later, it has not yet taken place.
Discomfort in some sectors
The agreement with Morocco and Mauritania did not please everyone in the Spanish government, at a time when Prince Juan Carlos had to assume the position of acting head of state before the recovery of Franco – who would end up dying on November 20 – and the country was preparing for the transitional phase after nearly 40 years of the Franco regime.
This is what the CIA said in an intelligence report dated November 15, 1975, the day after the meeting in Madrid. A senior official involved in the negotiations told the US Embassy that it was a “bad deal” but that it was “necessary because of the apparent inability of the United Nations to prevent the situation from deteriorating into war.”
According to this document, seen by Europa Press, the Spanish government was concerned about Algeria’s reaction, because it was the main supplier of natural gas – and remains so today – and Algeria has made clear at all times that it supports self-determination for Western Sahara. However, the report highlights that “Madrid apparently preferred to risk its energy supply rather than indulge in hostilities” in its colony.
On the other hand, Washington was clear about who benefited most from what was agreed upon: “The agreement is a victory for King Hassan II, who has long sought to annex at least part of the Spanish Sahara.” Moreover, the report actually predicted what eventually happened, which was that Morocco and Mauritania would divide the former Spanish colony once the Spanish authorities left.
Thus, he predicted that as officials involved, and taking into account that Rais Alema had already defected to Morocco – where he arrived on 5 November to pay homage to the Alaouite monarch – the outcome of the consultations would ultimately end in “a decision to divide the territory, giving Morocco the northern region, rich in phosphate deposits, and Mauritania the south, with iron ore.”
Secret attachments
On the other hand, the fact that the declaration was accompanied by four annexes, the content of which was not initially made public and which mainly referred to economic issues related to Western Sahara, also raised unease and doubts. Finally, some of its content was outdated when it was published by Interview magazine at the beginning of 1978.
Among other things, Morocco and Mauritania recognized “fishing rights in the Sahara waters for the benefit of 800 Spanish boats, for a period of 20 years and under the same current conditions, with the exception of fees that will be paid from the sixth year onwards,” whereby Spanish boats will be exempted during the first five years.
“For the next fifteen years, they would pay the fee that would be the best possible fee given to any third country with an agreed reduction,” which was to be determined by a mixed committee of the three countries before the start of the sixth year, as stated in Annex I.
In separate annexes signed separately with Morocco and Mauritania, two fishing agreements in their territorial waters were specified. In the Moroccan case, a maximum of 600 boats were allowed to fish in its waters on the “current Atlantic coast” and another 200 in its waters in the Mediterranean, with the list being submitted annually. In the case of Mauritania, it allowed 200 Spanish vessels to fish in its territorial waters, also by submitting a prior list.
In the case of Morocco specifically, it was also agreed to create a “joint venture” for mineral exploration and for Spain to participate 35% in the final companies that could emerge from it. In addition, Appendix Four included the Alawite Kingdom’s acquisition of 65% of Foss Boucraa Company, the mining company responsible for extracting phosphate in the desert, and paying the price of the shares based on their value on December 31, 1975.
Sahara Decolonization Law
After signing the tripartite agreement, the House of Representatives ratified the Sahara Decolonization Act, which was published in the Bank of England on November 20, 1975, the day of Franco’s death. In one article, the text “authorizes the government to carry out the actions and take the necessary measures to end the colonization of the Non-Self-Governing Sahara Territory, while protecting Spanish interests.”
During his defense of it, Presidential Minister Antonio Caro Martinez explained that “the Sahara belongs to Spain, but the Sahara is not Spain.” The official qualification of the territory “was at no time an effort of assimilation” but rather “Franco always expressed his desire to respect the freedom and sovereignty of the Sahrawis.”
The minister added that this is “a noble attempt to place the Sahrawis on a level of strict legal equality with all Spanish citizens,” adding that he wanted to make clear that the law – which was approved by 345 votes to four, with four abstentions – “does not affect the sovereignty or unity of the national territory” of Spain, because “the Sahara is not subject to sovereignty and does not constitute an integral part of the national territory.”
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