Even among experts it is ignored a crucial precursor to nuclear relations with the United States, which becomes relevant in the current policy of rapprochement between both countries, on a matter such as security, which represents the absolute priority of each country and the world agenda, since it relates to nothing less than the life or death of States.
Between years 50 and 83 Argentina had made extraordinary progress in “sensitive” or dual nuclear technology, which, although not for war purposes, but for far-reaching peaceful purposes, was managed exclusively by the Navy – all presidents of the CNEA from its founding until 1983 were sailors – with absolute secrecy and unhelpful arrogance. vis-a-vis the world through the CNEA/Navy itself and not through the State Department, which aroused strong suspicion in Brazil – still ruled by the military and racing to catch up with us – and in the US, which feared an India-Pakistani style horizontal proliferation scenario in South America.
The issue gained global visibility and litigation, as revealed by two historical scenes. In 1951, Perón outraged the world when he announced that Argentina had mastered “nuclear fusion” – far superior to the nascent nuclear fission of Hiroshima and uncontrolled by anyone – although it later emerged that he had been deceived by a charlatan Austrian physicist. The other highlight of this policy was the military government’s announcement between the victory and Alfonsín’s inauguration that the country had mastered the technology of uranium enrichment at Pilcaniyeu, a development so secret that he fainted when it was told to the US chargé d’affaires at San Martín Palace.
President Alfonsín had to reckon with democratic restoration the difficult technical, political and ethical trilemma inherited from the military government over the fate of this delicate technology, which it has resolved with transcendent wisdom: to continue its remarkable peaceful progress, but to subject it to civil and parliamentary control, the scrutiny of public opinion and the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its international aspects – ironically lacking interference in a priority issue on the world agenda – for which there is the General Directorate for Nuclear Affairs and Disarmament (Digan), which still exists and whose reputation is confirmed by the fact that Ambassador Rafael Grossi, current Director of the IAEA and candidate for Secretary-General of the United Nations, was trained there.
Above all, Alfonsín understood that he could not continue with that policy of secrecy and arrogance that aroused so much suspicion and pressure in Brazil and the United States. With the first, he began a determined policy of trust-building, which was perfected and institutionalized and consecrated with his invitation to Sarney to visit them together in Pilcaniyeu, the world-historical significance of which was movingly highlighted by the Brazilian at Alfonsín’s funeral and which was a condition indispensable prerequisite for the creation of Mercosur.
He also encouraged a framework of open, regular dialogue and the building of trust and mutual respect, institutionalizing the so-called annual rounds of Argentine-American bilateral talks on nuclear issues that addressed concerns on the matter with this power, which I described in its first three founding issues (Bs.As., December 1985; Washington DC, September 1986; and Bs.As., March 1988) as a fruitful “exercise in transparency.”
Celebrating the 40th anniversary of that first meeting should be a source of pride and commemorating an Argentine initiative of extraordinary importance for bilateral relations with the United States, but above all for the security of our continent and the world.
Career diplomat and doctor of political science
About The Author
