The twentieth edition of the United States National Security Strategy is a document voluminous in words and economical in size: in 33 pages marked by populism and contradictions, it proposes the burial of the order established after the end of the Second World War, 80 years ago.
Edited almost silently by the Donald Trump administration on the 5th, the text caused justified shock in Europe and Latin America, as well as praise in previously unthinkable places: Moscow and Beijing.
In the only strategy of his first term, in 2017, Trump again called Russia and China active enemies against the United States.
Now the Chinese are necessary economic partners, in a remarkably sober chapter of the text that recognizes the failure of the approach that believed in Westernizing Beijing through trade. Taiwan receives discreet treatment, with the United States rejecting China’s strong-arm solutions but favoring deterrent measures over offensive measures.
For the president who launched Cold War 2.0 against Xi Jinping in 2017, this is quite a change. It must pass the reality test, and the recent confrontation between China and Japan is the first step on this train.
This strategy seems correct when we assert that what matters to the United States is American interest. But it is the details that attract attention: being pragmatic without pragmatism, having principles rejecting idealism, opting for military force without being militaristic.
It is an incoherent salad that targets specific short-term situations, in line with Project 2025, the populist-conservative ideology that guides the ideological wing of the Trump administration.
Most important, especially for enemies, is the abandonment of eight decades of leadership based on a discourse of common democratic values. It seemed absurd at times, but the conflict with the Soviet Union during the Cold War was ideological: the United States feared the spread of communism.
This is why they came to blows, for example, in the quagmires of Korea and Vietnam. From now on, the ideological element of a document full of ideology is removed: Chinese communism, previously criticized, disappears.
The new north is profit. In this sense, the emphasis on “America First” takes the form of foreign policy, with the defense of control of production lines and critical materials. While how to achieve this is debatable, as a goal it is entirely reasonable if you’re American.
If you live in Latin America, the document borders on a declaration of war. On the one hand, another contradiction appears when the text calls on the United States to stop being the world’s policeman, ironic given that it was the flag of the American left in the 1970s, but decrees the “Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine”.
The term apes the “Roosevelt Corollary” of 1904, when then-President Theodore Roosevelt announced he would implement the Monroe Doctrine of nearly a century earlier with a club.
The doctrine said that the United States would take care of its strategic backyard and the Europeans would take care of theirs. But originally, it was not done with cannons because the Americans had few of them. When they became abundant, a long history of interventionism took hold.
Trump wants to be this Roosevelt, as evidenced by the military escalation aimed at overthrowing Nicolas Maduro. He promises prosperity to the allies who follow him, putting Lula’s Brazil (PT), which is considering normalization with Trump, in a particular situation. At home, the Republican calls for the closure of borders and xenophobia.
Europe constitutes another critical focus, where ideology this time takes the upper hand against the allies. The continent is being punished for having “weak leadership” and flirting with “civilizational erasure” given the influence of immigration and “woke culture.”
The text advocates support for far-right parties fighting against perceived leniency within the European Union. NATO has already been reprimanded for months. Unsurprisingly, the reaction from continental leaders was the worst since Vice President JD Vance gave a similar speech in Munich in February.
In practice, it is Ukraine that must pay. In the name of the business environment, the document suggests a rapid end to the war started by Russia and a “restoration of strategic balance” with Moscow. Vladimir Putin can smile, at least until he sees that his country is not treated as a superpower, but as another European actor.
In the same spirit, the Middle East should be a place of economic leisure and not of “endless wars”. This aspect is positive, given the evident failure of the United States in its attempt to impose democracy in the region and other countries as part of the former war on terrorism.
The assessment, as in the Russian and Chinese cases, ignores the nature of the regimes. So the fact that the heir to the Saudi throne heard Trump say that the dismemberment of a journalist in a consulate of the kingdom “is happening” is an earlier corollary to this assertion.
Tainted by fascist notions such as “health of the nation”, the text may not have the expected scope, as is usual, and could be overturned in the future. But the institutional erosion promoted by Trump suggests greater permissiveness in its adoption, beyond the fact that he was elected on this platform.
The framework of international organizations tasked with mediating relations between countries, established with US support, is outdated, but it is unclear what Trump will offer in return.
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