Beyond multilateralism | profile

MADRID – The world is on the brink of one profound geopolitical restructuringas growing great power rivalries undermine the multilateral structures that have maintained global order since the mid-20th century.

Preventing the international system from descending into chaos and conflict are those who are unwilling to accept a world ruled solely by brute force They must find ways to shore up weakened multilateral institutions through informal agreements and bilateral agreements.

From the end of World War II to the early 2010s, multilateralism provided the framework for international cooperation. Although imperfect and often incoherent, it was the most effective global governance model ever created. But after more than a decade of sustained erosion, it is clear that the multilateral system as we know it can no longer enable collective action. Without a framework capable of coordinating relations between countries, the alternatives are stark: a world government – an unrealistic possibility – or a slow movement towards anarchy.

Multilateralism emerged as a pragmatic middle ground: collective decisions and binding rules, rather than a single global authority or the complete absence of authority.

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This model emerged from unique historical circumstances and took shape as the United States—the dominant postwar world power—promoted a treaty-based system guided by enlightened self-interest. This vision was realized in the conferences of Bretton Woods And San Franciscowhich gave rise to the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its successor, the World Trade Organization.

In principle, if not always in practice, these multilateral institutions were open to all countries. Organizations such as the WTO and the International Civil Aviation Organization provided a common framework of rules, standards and responsibilities. But in recent years they have been significantly weakened by increasing sovereignty in both developed economies such as the United States and emerging economies such as China.

The United States, for its part, had done so a significant role in the deterioration of the institutions he helped found. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its intervention in the Libyan civil war in 2011 showed that the major powers did not feel bound by the so-called rules-based international order. This trend was reinforced by the election of Donald Trump in 2016, and his return to power in 2025 represented an explicit rejection of the multilateral approach.

At the same time, Russia and China have sought to undermine a system they see as detrimental to their interests. The Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 openly violated international law and once again led to large-scale war in Europe. Likewise, the “Made in China 2025” industrial strategy violates WTO rules, and China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea show a complete disregard for the 2016 arbitration ruling that rejected its extensive maritime claims.

The consequences are already visible: in the most important questions Multilateral institutions have stopped driving global decision-making. Paralyzed by conflicting vetoes from its permanent members, the UN Security Council is largely inactive, with the notable exception of recently endorsing Trump’s Gaza peace plan. At the same time, the WTO — which was founded in 1995 and represents the last significant achievement of multilateralism — can no longer enforce its own rules because the United States abolished its appellate body in 2019.

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This institutional paralysis is part of a broader trend. No major multilateral institution has been created for decades, while informal arrangements – without binding rules and often involving non-state actors – have proliferated, offering more flexible and adaptable forms of coordination better suited to an increasingly fragmented world. Today, Multilateral institutions make up only a quarter of the global governance ecosystem.

In this context andPreventing the collapse of the international order is an enormous task. What is needed are intermediate mechanisms that do not rely on general participation or the adoption of comprehensive and binding rules. Although reaching global consensus is virtually impossible, informal alliances, public-private platforms and flexible coordination mechanisms can help mitigate geopolitical risks.

Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance – which has vaccinated more than a billion children since 2000 – offers a useful model, as does the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers with its globally recognized technical standards (including Wi-Fi) and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Although they lack legal authority, these organizations gained technical legitimacy and broad voluntary membership. Previously they were secondary to multilateral institutions; Today they could become pillars of global coordination.

As private actors, subnational governments, academic institutions and professional networks gain influence, diplomacy is no longer the exclusive domain of foreign ministries. Global governance, in turn, is becoming increasingly decentralized, particularly in critical areas such as cybersecurity.

To prevent a global catastrophe, the current institutional vacuum must be filled by flexible and operational arrangements: less formal, less universal and less binding, but still capable of facilitating cooperation between countries and key actors. These include public-private partnerships, interregional agreements such as the EU-Mercosur trade agreement and “coalitions of the willing” such as the Just Energy Transition Alliances.

However, this approach involves higher transaction costs and cannot guarantee security or consistency. However, the task of those responsible for international policy is not to design the perfect model, but to identify the one that is most practical a rapidly changing world on the verge of systemic collapse.

Javier Solanaformer High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, former Secretary General of NATO and former Foreign Minister of Spain, is President of EsadeGeo – Center for Global Economics and Geopolitics. Angel Saz Carranza He is director of EsadeGeo – Center for Global Economics and Geopolitics and professor of strategy and politics at Esade.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2025.
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