The international development aid system appears to have disappeared in what could be the most serious crisis in its history. A crisis that is, in the first place, presumed to be triggered by the Trump administration’s aggressive cuts and reductions in aid funds announced by a large group of European countries. As a result, the system is expected to lose between a fifth and a third of its resources. These decisions were also taken in a rather favorable political context. With the growing presence of nationalist and ultra-conservative parties (and governments), linked to the extreme right, resistant to multilateral action and whose agenda confronts the objectives of environmental sustainability, social equity and respect for human rights which inspire development action. Clearly, there is barely time for words.
However, as important as these factors are, it is important to make no mistake that the aid crisis is ahead of this presupposed dimension and is anticipated by Trump and at the height of the far right. Its origin lies in the inability of the system to respond, with the required radicalness, to the tectonic changes produced in the international environment.
To begin with, the theoretical premises that gave rise to aid were overcome in the shortest possible time. The hypothesis according to which the growth model of rich countries could be exported to the rest of the world through measured transfers of capital and knowledge turned out to be too simple. We know today that the experience of industrialized countries is far from being a model and that development is a fundamentally endogenous process, which admits of numerous variations, depending on the specificities of each country.
The international aid system that is developing it is expected to lose between a fifth and a third of its resources.
The universe of potential beneficiaries has also changed. Countries that were once aid recipients are now thriving economies and attractive investment scenarios. The heterogeneity of the world has increased during development and the North-South duality (donor-recipient) is today poorly representative of international reality. We live, without a doubt, in an unequal world, but between its extremes there is a large group of countries that can, at any time, be providers of cooperation and need help.
Regardless, the harshest critics favor the type of relationships that promote discretion, on the one hand, and dependence and subordination, on the other. Thus, the hierarchical structure of the system, dominated by donors, is called into question, as well as the neocolonial language which promotes a mixture of paternalism and technocratic arrogance, empathy and strategic calculation.
In essence, the crisis expresses the loss of hegemony of Western powers, which motivated the creation of international aid. Facing them today stand new powers from the developing world (such as China, India, Brazil and Turkey), with distinct visions of international action. All have activated their own cooperation systems, which compete with the action of traditional donors. Thus, while the aid promoted by the OECD seems trapped by institutional inertia, in the South the fluid field of cooperation thrives for development which brings new providers to the South: a world rich in experiences, but little inclined to standards. How can we face the future and bring order to this system?
Even if this scenario is not desirable, it is not possible to rule out the gradual decline of OECD aid, doomed by the disinterest of those who created it, while new donors (like China), with limited shared standards, have acquired greater importance. This would end up amplifying the disorder and fragmentation of the system. However, one could imagine three alternative models to those which, ideally, could focus on reforms.
While the aid promoted by the OECD seems trapped by institutional inertia, in the South the fluid field of development cooperation that the new providers of the South are prospering
The first step would be to recognize the heterogeneity of the world in terms of development and the new presupposed restrictions, trying to restore the donor-recipient duality, but in the context of a simplified agenda and a more demanding selection of recipient countries. If it would be a back to basicsby focusing our efforts where they are most needed. Its agenda would focus on addressing humanitarian crises, addressing vulnerability and poverty, and strengthening institutions in countries with fragile states. The objective of this model, which revolves around the fight against extreme poverty, is the one which garners the most support in public opinion, judging by the results of the surveys. In exchange, this option would imply renouncing cooperation in favor of greater transformative ambition.
The second model would be based on the idea that once the North-South divide has been reduced, cooperation should focus not on the differences between countries, but on what unites them: the management of shared challenges. Cooperation therefore extends from the field of solidarity and redistribution to common interests and the management of interdependencies (such as climate change). This agenda is better understood in academic circles than in public opinion, although the idea of ​​pooling efforts to address common challenges can be very compelling. Given the scale of the problems, cooperation will have to go beyond the limits of international aid in this case, involving new actors and new resources. Although it fits well into debates about global governance, this model may relegate some central development challenges – such as inequality or poverty – which do not constitute good global public problems in the strict sense.
The third model would seek further transformation ambitious and integrative of the cooperation system. It would be assumed that cooperation is an instrument to support and stimulate national development processes, with a perspective of transformation (and not just assistance) of medium and broad scope. This requires a complex program that adapts to the conditions of each individual, from covering basic needs, in contexts of poverty, to acting as a catalyst for change, in more advanced situations. All countries will be called upon to take on this task, including traditional OECD donors, each according to their capacities, while a dialogue will be activated to establish shared norms and standards, with different levels of requirements depending on the situation of the countries. Such a system requires inclusive and representative governance, which should be anchored in the United Nations.
Three models for the future, pues, which respond to three different strategies in the face of the crisis: defensive first, to save the fundamentals; to move the agenda to Monday, to encourage more support; and with a transformative ambition during the third year, to democratize the system and make it inclusive, facing the new complexity of today’s world. The exploration of these and other scenarios should be the subject of an international commission and an intergovernmental dialogue, as was encouraged today by the Pearson Commission in the 1960s or by the Brandt Commission in the 1980s. Never more justified than now.
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