He was a senator for twelve years, president of the UCR and founder of Cambiemos. Away from the foreground and all responsibility, he analyzes in dialogue The Chronicler to the government of Javier Milei, the demands of society and the role of his former partners of radicalism and the PRO before the libertarian proposal.
-Half of Javier Milei’s term has expired. What is your management record?
-The end result of the two years is surprising to everyone. At the beginning of the term, no one paid too much attention to the weaknesses that the government expected: Due to its parliamentary and political weakness, there were no governors or mayors. It was a outsider that he had won an election with a disruptive speech and that he had come to disrupt all plans. So it was a big question mark. Two years later, he hasn’t done badly in this regard.
The problem is that the government has accumulated light and shadow. The state cannot manage these lights and shadows, it cannot balance them out. Then there is a permanent conflict.
The example is what happened in Congress now in December. The budget in the Chambers of Deputies and the work modernization in the Senate begin in the area of lights, with positive expectations for the government, since it has better objective conditions than before. He only needed a few votes to advance. Now the government has continued in the shadows due to incompetence or whatever. Couldn’t reach enough number for the entire budget, although he left a lot behind – sometimes promises, sometimes ATN, sometimes other things. However, He was unable to discipline the few voices he lacked.
-How do you imagine what is coming based on what you observe?
-If I let these last few weeks guide me, I predict two complicated years in politics. And that should no longer be the case after the election results. The government should take these two years more calmly, but that obviously won’t be the case.
What is coming or should come in economic terms is a different model than in the first two years. There was a model of adaptation, of limitation, which was obviously necessary, but now, in these second two years, a productive and development model had to emerge.
– If we follow the argument: it seems that when the government is in a tight spot, it brings out its best weapons and improves its position, as was the case after the elections in Buenos Aires. But when he is in a good position, he escapes and does not consolidate.
-Yes, exactly. The state works better when it is on the ropes than when it has to manage its own capital.. It’s almost like a survivor. The survivor achieves the result of being able to live on, but when he wins the lottery he doesn’t know what to do with the money.
-There are many colleagues of yours who participated in Together for Change and are now in the libertarian ranks, either formally or in a very narrow orbit. This coalition had a completely different discourse than the current governing party, with completely different priorities, values and positioning. How do you explain that?
-The agreement, or at least a thoughtful look, from everyone who has ever been part of Together for Change has to do with the fact that the failure of the Macri government and the failure of the lost 2023 election, when everything was about winning, still hurts.
There is a kind of guilt towards society that makes it necessary to also support the macroeconomic direction of this government. Above all, because there is something that has identified and still identifies all those who were there at Together for Change, it is that none of them want Kirchnerism to appear on the scene again. In short: no one is united by love, but rather by fear. People and politicians sometimes know very well what they don’t want, although sometimes it is not clear to them what they really want.
-My doubt is to what extent one can eat, heal and educate with anti-Kirchnerism…
-No, no, without a doubt. Let’s see, my analysis of Together for Change is not praise, but an explanation of a real situation. Sometimes I ask myself: Why should you accompany this government? Well, in some cases it’s because the government has done or wants to do things that are right: balancing the budget, getting the accounts in order, getting rid of a lot of bureaucracy. On the other hand, there is also a Kirchnerist model that destroys a state because of its excessive size.
In short, populism tends towards a model of destruction of the state: the right because it does not believe in the state, and the left because it believes that it is the only thing there is and assigns so many functions to it that it is phagocytosed and ends up being of no use.
-Many of the historic values of radicalism appear to be out of fashion today, both in this administration and in general. How do you make policy on the basis that what you have always proposed today is not demanded by society?
-Just because society doesn’t demand it doesn’t mean the values aren’t current. The fact that society has different priorities today and that they voted for Milei because of these priorities is a wake-up call for my party and politics in general. There’s a lot of debate about what happened and I think there’s a lot of blame to go around. What cannot be denied now is that these values must remain, because for me they are latent. The value of separation of powers, decency in public administration, periodicity of functions, connection with a multipolar world, true federalism. All of these things must emerge at some point; radicalism cannot do without them. It is true that it may not bring votes today, but it cannot be abandoned because it is the reason for existence.
If radicalism today chose to abandon these values and this doctrine simply because they are not fashionable and adopted a different kind of doctrine, it would cease to be radicalism.
I believe that you need other protagonists, young and fresh, so that society falls in love with you again. Because be careful, other models that have nothing to do with this, but rather defend corporations and industry interests, have recently appeared not only in radicalism. There is something for every taste. Radicalism is no exception.
-Recently there was a change in the law in Congress. Recently there have been numerous rearrangements, room and block changes. A few decades ago Borocotó was a scandal, today there is no longer any sanction for something like that. How do you analyze representation in Argentina? Is it more difficult than at other times, is it a local phenomenon?
-It’s not just an Argentine phenomenon, it’s global. The decline of the traditional representation system of political parties can be observed everywhere. Also the appearance of disturbing caudillismos. Milei is an up and coming player, but not the only one.
What worries me in Argentina is the question of whether Congress is the mirror of society. That’s where it hits you, because if that’s the case, we’re screwed as a society. A fragmented society without traditional values.
-When they founded Cambiemos in 2015, there was a polarization between Kirchnerism and anti-Kirchnerism. How do you compare this polarization to the current one? Is the crack bigger or smaller, is there more or less dialogue?
-Both have a common ingredient: the axis is Peronism. Historically this has always been the case, but I believe that Kirchnerism brings with it most of the polarization when it appropriates judicialism. If he maintains all Peronism, he will assume an incipient hegemonic role. But after 125, an opposition emerges that reaches Gauleguaychú and Cambiemos. The polarization was very strong because the danger came from Venezuela. Kirchnerism could never eliminate this specter.
Now if you look at the elections you will find Peronism and non-Peronism everywhere. To find non-Peronism, you sometimes have to add fractions that have nothing to do with each other. What happened in the presidential election was that all non-Peronists united behind the vote for Milei.
– Do you expect something similar for 2027?
It depends on many factors. Kirchnerism cannot find a successor for Cristina, Kicillof is having difficulties. We have to see if there is room for the formation of a third position. The ball is in the air, a lot of it has to do with what we talked about at the beginning: how the government deals with light and shadow.
-How do you see the role of governors? There is sometimes a certain amount of give and take in Congress. It is also observed that they enjoy high reputation in their districts but find it difficult to break into the national arena.
-I don’t think this third way I mentioned can be constructed with the photo of several governors together. I didn’t believe in the United Provinces from the beginning and I don’t believe now. The governors have a bad scenario in front of them, with a very ossified federal system, without a real federal co-determination law that stimulates and with a national government that, under the pretext of adjustment, is managed in a discretionary manner and also without a budget in the first two years. The governors, even if they come together, cannot build anything because the federal system is in crisis.
-How do you analyze the generation problem? Are the successors of your generation better or worse in Argentine politics?
-I can’t fit them all in my pocket. There are many boys who are well educated. For example, radicalism has just elected a 36-year-old president (Leonel Chiarella). His great achievement is that he did very well as mayor in Venado Tuerto. That’s a win. Does that alone allow him to be a national leader? Well, the coin is in the air. I’m striving for an autonomy of judgment that I can build up without bad advice, let’s put it that way.
Now the emergence of libertarians in general has not brought about a qualified renewal. So much so, in fact, that they had to resort to old political swords to make policy. The example is Patricia Bullrich in the Senate and Diego Santilli as Minister of the Interior.
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