Europe seeks “in extremis” a political solution to pay the bill for the war in Ukraine | International

Rules and legislation cannot anticipate a good crisis. Fifteen years ago, the Great Recession demanded answers from Europe that weren’t in the regulations and the Germans opposed everything again and again until Mario Draghi found a way to convince them. Europe’s values ​​and solidarity have disappeared along the way, as Greece has seen, forced into brutal budget cuts. The euro and a possible implosion of the EU were at stake. History does not repeat itself, but it rhymes: once again, Europe is playing its raison d’être in this cross game between Russia, the United States and China, with Ukraine as a pim-pam-pum doll. Once again, a way must be found so that rules and legislation do not block a political decision: in this case, using Russian assets or devising another mechanism to guarantee Ukraine’s financing and allow it to continue to defend itself. This time, it is not the single currency that is in danger: it is the security of Europe. A key European summit is approaching for Ukraine, which amounts to telling all of Europe: Ukraine is the fundamental piece of continental defense against Vladimir Putin’s post-imperial expansionism. Brussels wants to give a clear signal to the United States after a year spent toning down the bagpipes and lighting the candles so that Trumpism does not get angry.

The EU seeks to the extreme a political solution to finance the war in Ukraine if the United States stops providing funds. The preferred option is to unfreeze Russian assets. If there is no agreement for this, Brussels intends to use the European budget as leverage via Eurobonds (common debt) or for Member States to put new money on the table. None of these options guarantee obtaining the majorities necessary to move them forward: the European curse was and continues to be diabolical decision-making.

Using Russian means could derail Trump’s plan to achieve a ceasefire and trigger the hybrid war that Moscow loves so much; Otherwise, Ukraine would find itself without funds to continue holding the front, and Europe would therefore be left behind. Spoiler: Everything indicates that there will be a last minute agreement. The alternative would be the umpteenth European catastrophe of recent times. And the Union cannot afford another fiasco.

These are the key subjects of the next two days, where Brussels will, once again, have to juggle barbed wire.

1. The money trail. Ukraine may run out of funds to continue financing the war between the second and third quarters of 2026. The United States wants a peace deal so it does not have to continue investing dollars in kyiv, and if Washington did not put money on the table, Ukraine would only rely on the Europeans. The EU wants to send a political message to Trump: it will release this funding, whatever the cost. There are three ways to do this. First: use as leverage the little more than 200 billion in Russian assets frozen in several countries (mainly in Belgium) to compensate for the losses caused since the invasion. Two: with new money from the Twenty-Seven. And three: with Eurobonds, the common European debt like that which is used to finance post-covid funds, the famous Next Generation. The countries’ public finances are not in the best shape: a lot of money has to be spent on defense and the green deal, and several countries have public debts greater than 100% of GDP (France, Italy and Spain, without going any further). There is no appetite for options two and three. Germany does not want Eurobonds, even in the field of painting, as almost always. But Belgium, whose financial institutions house the vast majority of Russian assets, is blocking the first option unless security guarantees are obtained.
2. Collateral damage. The use of Russian assets is the main goal of the summit, but this agreement also has side effects. First: more than possible requests to international courts and arbitration tribunals. Second: derail peace negotiations. And third: that Russia returns to its old habits with the hybrid war which affected, for example, Belgian airports. US diplomacy, which was very sophisticated a few years ago but is now just a transcription of The Sopranos, is putting pressure on Europe not to use Russian assets. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has suggested that the United States does not approve of the use of Russian assets. “It’s difficult to sit down with Putin and say: we’re going to reach a peace deal, but we’re going to keep your money,” Tusk said.
3. Legal euphemisms and flushes. It is Belgium, which houses the vast majority of Russian assets and therefore fears Russian reprisals, which is blocking this decision. And it is Germany and the European institutions that will put pressure on the Belgians to give in. Belgium requires guarantees: guaranteeing that if it has to return the money in the future, the partners will pay freely. Brussels is a repair factory. For now, a euphemism has come out of his pocket to swallow the pill: it is no longer a question of confiscating Russian assets but of granting “a reparation loan”. It is now a matter of giving him a bath in chocolate: a soft mattress of guarantees. During the last meetings, there was no white smoke. The Belgian government of Bart de Wever (Flemish nationalist, part of Giorgia Meloni’s political family in the European Parliament) blocked this decision until the last minute. It is very possible that the Belgian parties will unanimously give De Wever a negotiating mandate. Unanimously: unheard of in an almost ungovernable country like Belgium. This little theater is common during European summits, to facilitate the sale of this decision here (two thirds of Belgians are against the use of Russian assets, according to polls). And to increase the price and obtain the maximum guarantees.
4. Vested interests. European politics always hides national interests behind sacrosanct European values. The greater good is to ensure that Ukraine has Europe. But everyone defends their national interests. Those of the Belgians are very clear: money. Those of Germany too: if Russian assets are not used, the door will have to be opened to common debt, to Eurobonds, and among German conservatives, this is anathema. France appears ambivalent because some of its companies have major interests in Russia (Total). Italy, likewise (Unicredito), and Meloni also look askance at Trumpism, which has always considered it as a potential ally in the Union.
5. The “on the brink” curse is back. The European strategy is to reach a last-minute agreement on the use of Russian assets through a legal trick: it is the center stage, with all the trappings of the big last-minute summit decisions. The old curse of Brussels is still relevant: Europe will be forged in crises, on the edge of the abyss. When the EU is in danger, political motivations to stay together have always trumped economic and national interests. That’s how it was during the Great Depression. With Trump, the techno moguls and their far-right branches in Europe, starting with Hungary but passing through Italy, everything is more diffuse today than 15 years ago. Without a deal, Ukraine could go bankrupt, and therefore lose the war: Europe’s security is at stake. At the same time, the EU will try to keep Trump on board, which will not be easy either. One of these moments of truth is approaching, in which history shifts and defines itself. This is a decision that concerns the future of Ukraine, but also Europe-United States and Europe-Russia relations. With Russian assets, the peace process may collapse and trigger Trump’s wrath. Without these assets, we must dig deep to allow Ukraine to continue to defend itself, with Eurobonds or new money.
6. Crossfire. This is a difficult time for Europe. Trump’s security strategy has made it clear that the United States is no longer the historic ally it always was: today, it is virtually the opposite. Von der Leyen’s conciliatory strategy with the White House is a failure. Russia shows no signs of wanting to stop the war. China is trying to reach a trade deal with the United States, but by flooding European markets with its exports to avoid American tariffs. On top of all this, the European economy is stagnating, the succession of crises in recent times has left several countries with very large debts, Germany is experiencing a model crisis and France is dangerously close to a debt crisis, with a president who is a lame duck, without budgets, without the possibility of making reforms. 2026 promises. But first we have to save the Ukrainian ball.