Fragile optimism after the “Peace Dinner” in Berlin

The two days of negotiations concluded, on the night of the 15th, at the German Chancellery, with a “Peace Dinner”. Banquet attended by Zelensky, the European troika (Merz, Macron and Starmer), representatives of other European countries, Von der Leyen, Costa and Trump’s special envoys, Witkoff and Kushner. Even Trumpby videoconference, was present at the banquet.

Three quick conclusions can be drawn from this Berlin event. The first concerns the apparent progress towards the ceasefire sought. The second is that Europe has managed to appear in the picture of the negotiations, even if it plays the role of “pagafantasy”. And the third is that Spain, which until recently played an important international role, being plunged into national hell worn by Sánchezit no longer appears and is no longer expected.

But the matter is not closed. We must now wait for the Russian response at the end of these tripartite negotiations (United States, Ukraine and EU). Of these 20 points, four appear to be essential.

The first concerns security guarantees. These would constitute the guarantee that the weapons will fall definitively silent after a definitive ceasefire. They pose two successive problems. First, such guarantees should be intimately and unwaveringly attached to the United States, which is the only country capable of permanently guaranteeing them. And second, how to implement such sponsorship without constituting, in Moscow’s eyes, a threat to Russia’s security.

The second question is the territorial question or, in other words, how the new borders between Russia and the new Ukraine would be defined. It is difficult for Putin to resign a single square centimeter of the Ukrainian territory that it currently dominates. Call it Crimea or the “oblasts” of Lugansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. For his part, Zelensky will not be able to assume “de jure” this mutilation of his country, which could cost him his own head.

NATO and the EU

The third question to be resolved is that of the integration of the new Ukraine into NATO and the EU. According to Moscow, entry into the former would come directly against Russia’s security. In this regard, Zelensky declared in Berlin that he would be ready to abandon his interest in Ukraine’s entry into NATO, in exchange for further bilateral security guarantees (from the United States?). A very ethereal entry since such admission into the Alliance, if applicable, would require the prior invitation of all allies. Something that is not guaranteed to happen.

Ukraine’s membership in NATO, which Russia would never accept, is therefore out of the question. But EU membership would likely attract less rejection from Russia. In addition, this would surely be applauded by Trump, because it would mean for many community partners not only receiving a constant rival in the primary sector, but also placing on the Union a large part of the burden of economic recovery and reconstruction of a desolate country.

And the fourth question to be resolved concerns the size of the armed forces of the new Ukraine, which is expected to reach 800,000 soldiers. If we put aside Russia’s categorical denial of such a claim – which is no small matter – and consider, for example, that the total strength of the Spanish FAS is around 125,000 soldiers, this figure seems scandalously high. The immediate question is: who and how would finance Ukraine’s 800,000-strong FAS indefinitely?

In short, the inviolability of borders in Europe (Final Act of Helsinki, 1975) is a principle which goes bankrupt in Crimea in 2014. Eleven years later and after almost four years of war in Ukraine, this Helsinki dogma is difficult to reintegrate. The realities of the battlefield lead us to choose either to freeze the conflict with some security guarantees, or to contemplate how Ukraine continues to shrink territorially, economically devastated, its cities falling into ruins and its population disappearing.