The points plan is favorable for Russia. Threatening to force Ukraine to agree. Deadline not met. The manual the United States is using to try to end the invasion of Ukraine is very similar to the manual used in Gaza, and contains the same Kushner-Witkoff negotiating duo that achieved the ceasefire in the Strip — which Israel violates every day and which has not yet reached its most sensitive stage regarding the future of Gaza. Vitkov is expected to travel to Moscow this week to meet Putin, and Dan Driscoll will continue his contacts with Ukraine.
“If you don’t mind, Steve (Witkoff), let’s focus on Russia first, okay?” Trump told a shadow diplomat during his speech in the Israeli parliament celebrating the 20-point agreement on Gaza. Just a day later, Vitkov picked up the phone: “Maybe we will make a 20-point peace proposal, as we did in Gaza. We can do the same with you,” he told his Russian counterpart. The transcript of the October call, which was leaked this week, angered many over Witkopf’s rapprochement with Moscow. The American recommended, “Putin tells Trump that he is a man of peace. From there, it will be a very good call.”
I talked about all this with Alpaslan Ozerdem, dean of the Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter School of Peace and Conflict Resolution at George Mason University. Ozerdem has more than 20 years of experience researching how wars end, and has studied the cases of Afghanistan, Bosnia, El Salvador, Indonesia, Kosovo, Lebanon, Liberia, Nepal, Nigeria, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, Turkey, Somalia… “There is a family resemblance here between Ukraine and Gaza,” he says. “They are externally designed frameworks, with tight deadlines, a strong focus on ‘stability,’ and implementation mechanisms that rely on US convening power rather than independent institutions,” he adds.
“In both cases, the danger is in ‘complying’ or agreeing to anything rather than reaching a real agreement: managing violence without addressing its causes,” Ozerdem warns. “Gaza is mired in a dense web of unequal occupation, blockades, regional rivalries, and a serious humanitarian collapse. Ukraine is a war between countries with territorial claims, alliance issues, and a European security architecture at stake. Copying and pasting from one to the other will fail. In both cases, what is missing is credible follow-up, the spontaneity of sanctions or aid, and a real path to justice.”
Necessary conditions
The world is full of wars and attempted peace processes. Last week, the Sudanese army rejected an American proposal for a ceasefire in its war against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. The conflict erupted in 2023 as an internal power struggle and ended up becoming the world’s largest humanitarian crisis: famine, 14 million displaced, and over 40,000 dead (and perhaps many more) in a barely talked about genocide in which pools of blood can literally be seen from space. The Sudanese Major General denounced, “It is the worst document so far: it eliminates the armed forces, dissolves the security services, and leaves the militia in its place.” He added: If mediation continues in this direction, we will consider it biased mediation.
In the absence of independent oversight, automatic re-imposition of sanctions in the event of non-compliance, and an EU/OSCE multilateral law enforcement body with UN involvement, you get an intentionally frozen conflict.
Alpaslan Ozerdem
— George Mason University
Farther afield, in Turkey, this week a parliamentary committee made up of several parties, including ultra-nationalists, visited in prison Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party who recently saw the end of the armed struggle and the dismantling of the Kurdish guerrilla group that had been waging a war against the state for decades in which more than 40,000 people were killed.
“A successful peace process requires, at the very least, mutually destructive stalemate on the battlefield (both sides believe that continuing to fight will not improve their position); credible commitments (clear rules, independent monitoring, and predictable consequences for non-compliance); and a comprehensive determination that gives voice to those who have paid the highest price (victim groups, women, minorities, and displaced communities),” Ozerdem explains.
“Permanent agreements also depend on a security track (ceasefire, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants, police and judicial guarantees), a political track (participation, sequencing of elections, local governance) and an economic track (early recovery of livelihoods, not just macroeconomic promises). Transparency is important: the public must know the ‘why’, the ‘how’ and the ‘what next’, otherwise spoilers will determine the narrative.” “Justice is not a luxury. A combination of truth, reparations and targeted accountability is essential to achieving legitimacy.”
“Finally, the guarantor structure must last longer than electoral cycles,” he adds. “When implementation is left in the hands of a single capital or short-term envoy, parties will test the limits; when it is based on strong institutions with automatic mechanisms, compliance becomes the cheapest option.”
Models and examples from the past
What will it take for the operation to be successful in Ukraine? “The current proposals require Kiev to concede fundamental issues of security and sovereignty (permanent exclusion from NATO, restrictions on armed forces, de facto territorial recognition) in exchange for discretionary and personal guarantees,” the expert explains. “This is a classic problem of credible commitment.” “Without independent oversight, automatic reinstatement of sanctions in case of non-compliance, and a multilateral law enforcement body anchored in the EU and OSCE with UN involvement, you get a deliberately frozen conflict.”
He adds: “If the talks go ahead, they should prioritize: an independently monitored ceasefire line; intrusive verification (including drones, sensors and on-site equipment); a sequence linking any sanctions relief to verifiable measures; and a justice/victims pathway (seeking the truth, funding the compensation fund partly from sanctioned assets, and limited liability for the most serious crimes). Otherwise, a Minsk-style deflection and periodic escalation can be expected.”
I ask Özerdem about past examples that can be used as good and bad examples in both Gaza and Ukraine.
For the sake of Gaza
– Northern Ireland (Good Friday/Belfast) “for its comprehensive design, consent-based agreements and strong guarantors.”
– South Africa “For combining political transformation with a truth and redress framework. Both emphasize the need to integrate armed actors into norms that civilians can live with, while investing in institutions that outlast leaders.”
To avoid:
– The Oslo Accords “because there are no constraints that apply to the reality on the ground. They have privatized hope and disillusioned society. We must also avoid purely security approaches that postpone political rights indefinitely.” In the Oslo Accords, the two parties recognized each other and outlined a road map towards a Palestinian state, which only served to consolidate the Israeli occupation.
For Ukraine
– The Dayton Agreement (Bosnia) – which we talked about a week ago, and which is now 30 years old – as a model of stability for strict implementation, and not because of “racialization of governance.” The lesson here is to imitate a law enforcement force (an Implementation Force/stabilization force-like presence, an empowered civilian office) while avoiding frozen identity quotas. The Dayton Agreement created Bosnia with two semi-autonomous entities: one for the Serb population and the other for (Muslim) Bosnians and Croats.
– Colombia (2016) for “an advanced process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, a rural development agenda and a victim-centred justice system. It is useful to think about sequencing and legitimacy, even if the contexts are different.”
To avoid:
– Minsk 1/2, which tried to resolve the conflict in Donbas that began in 2014. “It was vague, implemented with little force and exploited quickly. Just like any agreement that relies on a single capital to monitor violations.”
Ozerdem concludes: “In all cases, the general rule is simple: a peace that is imposed impartially, interpreted transparently and is perceived as just, especially by the victims, is likely to last. A peace that is imposed vaguely and indifferent to dignity will not last.”
You have to see…
The film “Oslo” well reproduces the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians that ended under the Oslo Accords. I was extremely shocked to see how identical each side’s arguments were to those told to me by the Israeli and Palestinian authorities in my reports three decades later, a perfect reflection of their failure.
Thank you for coming this far.
See you next week!