Over the last two years, comparisons have been made between the governments of Carlos Menem And Javier Milei regarding its connection with the United States have been used in both serious analysis and political debates and clichés. At first glance, both They share a pro-Western and pro-capitalist stancein addition to the presence of Menem’s relatives in key positions during Milei’s tenure. However, The differences are clear and central.
The first and fundamental is the contrast between the Unipolarity led by the USA from 1989 until well into the first decade and a half of the 21st century. From that moment on, a bipolar structure emerged between the US and China. Conflict over hegemony that will accompany us in the coming decades, with implications on a global scale and particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. Added to this is the increasing economic and commercial compatibility between Argentina and the American superpower.
In recent years, strategic resources such as gas, oil and lithium have become increasingly important. The mining of copper, gold and uranium will be added step by step, as well as the use of the cold areas of Patagonia for the installation of artificial intelligence production centers. Attention should also be paid to a radical increase Importance of the South Atlantic and Drake’s strategic moves in the open and clear struggle between Washington and Beijing for control of the seas, that is, control of globalization.
You must always remember that the 95 percent of world trade circulates across the seas and a 90 percent Data transmission takes place via submarine cables.
During America’s past unipolarity, no one was able to challenge the Cold War victorious power against the Soviets. But in recent years, the Chinese regime has managed to surpass the number Marine units for military purposes by the Pentagon. However, the American Navy retains a clear advantage in total tonnage and 11 nuclear aircraft carriers to China’s zero.
Focusing on the domestic political level, the affinity in popular conservative rhetoric and aesthetics between Milei and Trump appears to be significantly greater than that between Bush Sr., let alone Clinton.
Another variable, no less changeable, is fatigue, which lasts more than two decades Kirchnerist history against the USA and anti-capitalism has spread throughout much of Argentine society. The silence of the Kirchnerists in the face of events in Venezuela and the defeats of the left in Chile and Bolivia are a clear example of this.
Brazil’s international position is another plus point. This country maintained close and pragmatic relations with the United States during the successive governments of Collor, Cardoso and the first two terms of office of Lula. This dynamic is obviously no longer the same in his third term. Which turns out a variable that Milei’s foreign policy can exploit face to face with Washington.
After this brief and certainly incomplete analysis, there is no doubt that the clearest point of distinction is Washington’s current position: Use clear reward and punishment guidelines (sticks and carrots). The firm and resolute support for Milei in the months leading up to the October 2025 general elections through a favorable agreement with the IMF in April, a subsequent $20 billion swap and the $2.1 billion intervention to strengthen the Argentine peso make this clear.
The Washington Treasury Department intervened only three times throughout its history. Two to support the Euro and one to support the Yen. The revocation of the visas of eight Lula-aligned judges of the Brazilian Court of Justice and the pressure to moderate the judiciary’s political harassment of the Brazilian right are classified as incidents.
Without a doubt, competition with China has led to this change compared to the apathy and disinterest of the past. No one doubts the excellent chemistry between Menem and Bush Sr. and then with Clinton, even though economic support was very limited. With some minor contributions during the tequila crisis of 1995. Menem himself would not or could not enforce Washington’s demands Free trade zone hemispheric as well as with the law of drug patents.
It is also worth remembering that Menem promoted Mercosur and economic ties with Brazil, which was not necessarily in the interests of the United States.
Milei is currently negotiating a far-reaching trade agreement with the superpower, as well as the decision to honor drug patents and his open criticism of Mercosur’s changes in general and Lula’s foreign policy in particular.
In conclusion, relations between Argentina and the United States in the present and in the foreseeable future seem to be geared towards having something much more substance and content than in the 90s.
In other words, this rapprochement with Washington entails much greater compromises than in the past. As well as a much greater interest and longer duration. It should be recalled that in late 2001, the incoming administration of Bush Jr. did not lift a finger to prevent Argentina’s political and economic collapse. Whether in the form of carrots or sticks, Washington appears to be on the right track to regain and consolidate its power in the region. Beyond Trump’s own verbal pyrotechnics, all indications are that this will continue for decades to come, beyond the political and ideological shifts in the White House.
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