In the afternoon of December 23, 1975As preparations were being made for New Year’s Eve parties, a violent event rocked the southern suburbs. The Arsenal depot battalion 601 “Domingo Viejobueno” in Monte Chingolo became the center of the largest armed operation of the Argentine guerrillas, an episode that, due to its consequences, was to mean the downfall of the Argentine guerrillas ERP (People’s Revolutionary Army).
The operation, planned since August of the same year, aimed to seize around 13 tons of military weapons. According to the ERP leadership, this would enable a coup that would deter (or at least postpone) the impending military intervention that was looming over the government Maria Estela Martinez de Peron.
The preparation for the attack was meticulous. A member of the organization, an architect, designed a detailed model of the barracks while a battalion consisting of troops from various ERP companies as well as reinforcements mobilized from Córdoba and Tucumán prepared for deployment. The tactical command was stationed in the San Telmo neighborhood from where the movements of a force that, according to various sources, were wavering between 180 and 260 guerrillas.
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The practice of professional and critical journalism is a mainstay of democracy. That is why it bothers those who believe that they are the owners of the truth.

However, a betrayal within the organization would ruin these preparations. The ERP was not aware that there was an intruder, Jesús “El Oso” Ranier, a former member of the Peronist forces who had deserted and worked as a logistics driver for the guerrilla organization for fifteen months.
It is believed that his information about the attack enabled the army to foresee it (the level of prior knowledge of the force is still disputed). It is believed that the ERP had received notification of the possible infiltration. However, Mario Roberto Santucho, the organization’s leader, dismissed the warning, citing confidence in the strength of its logistical structure and remaining silent in the face of the torture of some of the guerrilla group’s recently captured members.
The Guerrillas They retreated to a village near the barracks (Villa IAPI). The fighting continued there with countless shots and explosions.”
By the way, this decision to carry out a large-scale armed operation when there are signs of possible leaks will later be strictly assessed by members of the organization. Luis Mattini, who would be the organization’s leader after Santucho’s death, described the attack as a desperate act and an expression of political adventurism.
On the afternoon of December 23rd, the action began with the cutting of the nine bridges over the Riachuelo that connect the federal capital and the west with the south of the greater Buenos Aires area. ERP groups attacked provincial police brigades from various areas of the southern suburbs as well as certain military units. Traffic was also disrupted on the roads connecting La Plata with the south of greater Buenos Aires and security rings were set up around the Monte Chingolo barracks.
State Terrorism: There is no 1976 without 1973
At 6:50 p.m., about seventy guerrillas began attacking the barracks. The column of ERP vehicles, led by a truck followed by nine cars, managed to enter the property and fan out, but were met by machine gun fire.
The attackers managed to drive out the central guard and one of the companies, but were unable to advance beyond these points. The arrival of military reinforcements strengthened the defenders and the guerrillas withdrew to a town near the barracks (Villa IAPI). The fighting continued there with countless shots and explosions.
The wound of the 70s and the tough violence in Argentina
The battle lasted until the early hours of December 24th. helicopter They fired flares to illuminate the area while the military and police tracked down the guerrillas trying to escape. After midnight, machine gun fire echoed around Villa IAPI, where raids and patrols were being carried out, and army helicopters flew low overhead in search of survivors.
Many of the guerrillas were buried in a mass grave in the city “Avellaneda Cemetery”
The results were devastating for the ERP, as it is estimated that there were between 53 and 62 dead, dozens injured and missing. According to various sources, many of the guerrilla fighters killed were actually wounded and were directly executed by the repressive forces. The armed forces and security forces, for their part, suffered between seven and ten deaths. The bodies of many guerrilla fighters were buried in a mass grave in the city Avellaneda Cemetery (Documentation of this burial was accessed decades later).

A narrative of what happened can be found in the book Monte Chingolo The Greatest Battle of the Argentine Guerrilla, written by a special figure, Gustavo Plis Sterenberg, who, as a member of the PRT-ERP, later and due to various circumstances developed a very important career in music in Russia, where he became director of the Symphony Orchestra of the Mariinsky Theater in Saint Petersburg.
Plis Sterenberg comments on the attack on the Monte Chingolo barracks:
“It is December 23. On this day in 1975, during and after the largest confrontation between a guerrilla force and military personnel in Argentina, more than forty fighters of the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), five soldiers – three of them conscripts – and an undetermined number of neighbors died in the barracks and its surroundings.
“Like a large proportion of Argentines, the majority of residents of the modest neighborhoods around the former barracks do not know the names and stories of the dead. But even today they still retain a very special memory of them.” “Battle of Monte Chingolo‘”.
Some final thoughts. Leaving aside the negative judgments (very legitimate, by the way) that can be made about the government of Isabel Perón, it is worth noting that the attack on the barracks was carried out during a democratically elected government. Likewise, outside of the obvious moral judgments that can (and should) be made. armed struggleFrom a cold operational standpoint, time has shown that those who saw it as a tool for profound social change were tragically wrong.
Ultimately, this guerrilla operation, although large in scale, was not something isolated, but rather another link in the long list of political violence of the 1970s (not only by guerrilla groups, but also by organizations such as Triple A). As everyone will remember, the dark era of military dictatorship began shortly afterwards.