Organized criminal networks in Latin America, which converge between regional and supra-regional structures, are currently experiencing a historic economic boom. 2024 has likely established itself as the most lucrative year for the illicit economy, with record numbers in the hemisphere.
With the progression of what we call the “fourth wave of transnational crime” (COT), organized crime is no longer a peripheral threat to the majority of citizens. It has become a key actor that can pose an existential threat to the survival of representative democracy and the rule of law. The flood of illicit capital and corrupt practices in politics, both at national and regional levels, creates an urgent need to understand these new phenomena and formulate responses within an institutional and democratic framework.
The COT is characterized by operating with new markets, new players and unprecedented modalities. Some of these extra-regional actors, boldly emerging, behave as economically rational actors, responding to emerging opportunities and exploiting the transformations of illicit economies in all their manifestations.
Authoritarians don’t like that
The practice of professional and critical journalism is a mainstay of democracy. That is why it bothers those who believe that they are the owners of the truth.
Development of the phenomenon. The first wave was represented by Pablo Escobar and the Medellín Cartel. They were the pioneers in transporting tons of cocaine to the US market via Caribbean routes.
Under the leadership of the Cali Cartel, the second wave perfected a more sophisticated scheme for transporting cocaine to the United States and diversified routes through Central America and Mexico. Up until this point it had been about one product (cocaine) for one market (USA).
The third wave, the Bolivarian Revolution, is characterized by the criminalization of state structures used by armed groups such as the FARC, using cocaine production and trafficking as instruments of state policy and functionally modifying certain public policies. At this point, the main product (cocaine and gold) diversifies towards a main market (USA) with expansion into Europe.
The current fourth wave is characterized by the installation of supra-regional groups such as the Italian ‘Ndrangheta, Albanian mafias or Turkish criminal networks. They promote the distribution of synthetic drugs and the exploitation of illegal gold. In many cases, these organizations operate under the protection of authoritarian governments that describe themselves as left or right, exchanging capital from illicit markets for political protection.
Territorial control. This fourth wave is not exclusively characterized by violence, although it does include particularly bloody periods during disputes between local groups over strategic territorial control. However, their real threat lies in the ability of criminal organizations to establish parallel governance logics, exercise territorial control, penetrate institutions and replace functions of the state.
This strategy, often facilitated by the complicity of political networks within the state itself, has a double effect: it delegitimizes the state by demonstrating its inability to combat transnational crime, and gives legitimacy to criminal groups that take over state functions – such as ensuring security, creating jobs or imparting rudimentary forms of justice – more efficiently than formal institutions. It is a form of power that operates from the margins but has a direct impact on the core of our countries’ political, economic and social life.
These criminal actors are redefining the rules of the game in the territories. They take over state functions and corrupt the democratic foundations until very little of the institutional infrastructure remains. This is a phenomenon that, following the analogy of the virus described by Pablo Zeballos, initially spreads unnoticed until it kills the host body.
Transnational convergence. Evidence of the new convergence typical of the fourth wave abounds today. A clear example occurred in June 2025, when a court in Chile convicted two Chinese nationals, an Albanian and a Peruvian, for trafficking cocaine from Valparaíso to Rotterdam in the Netherlands. A few days later, the Colombian authorities, in a joint operation with the Italian and British police, arrested Giuseppe Palermo, one of the bosses of the powerful Calabrian mafia, the ‘Ndrangheta, in Santa Fe de Bogotá.
These events are clear examples of the new and dangerous convergences of transnational organized crime in Latin America. Extra-regional actors have forged unprecedented alliances and built global superstructures in coordination with regional and national criminal groups that control strategic territories and infrastructure.
Another paradigmatic example occurred in March 2025. A team of prosecutors in Arica, Chile, managed to get a court to convict 34 members of the Tren de Aragua crime gang for multiple acts of violence and murder. This group, which was born in Venezuela and now operates regionally, represents the particularly dangerous phenomenon such as the COT variant: Exo-Risk Crime (ECR).
Less democracy, more authoritarianism. The downside of the weakening of democratic states is the growth of ideologically agnostic authoritarianism. It remains in power and uses transnational organized crime groups as instruments of state policy. The most notable case was the alliance of the Bolivarian countries (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Cuba) with the FARC, when the guerrilla group was the largest producer of cocaine in the world.
The authoritarian states now defined by these alliances include Venezuela, Nicaragua and El Salvador. All follow the same model of authoritarian consolidation, although some define themselves as “left” and others as “right”. The biggest divide today is no longer between right-wing and left-wing ideologies, as in the past, but between participatory and institutional democracy and authoritarianism in alliance with transnational crime.
– Is there a way out?
– Latin America cannot continue to remain trapped between criminal violence and the authoritarian illusion that is now spreading in various parts of the region. This model is based on mega-prisons, mass arrests without evidence, collective trials without the right to adequate defense, and censorship of independent media. The way out is not to give up basic rights in exchange for apparent security – as authoritarianism based on the logic of the “enemy within” suggests – but rather to build security to protect rights.
From this difference lies the future of the region: move towards a solid and lasting institutional framework or decline into increasingly personalistic authoritarianism. Overcoming the authoritarian trap requires democratizing security, making information transparent, empowering communities, reclaiming territory through inclusion, and re-enchanting citizens with a state that functions, protects, and is accountable.
Giovanni Falcone, a judge murdered by the Italian Mafia, warned: “The audacity of organized crime is as great as the absence of the state.” This observation is more valid than ever in Latin America. Where the state is missing, crime takes over with power, violence and empty promises of order. The real way out is not to accept this substitution, but to restore state legitimacy based on efficiency, transparency and the protection of citizens’ rights.
*Founder and President of IBI Consultants LLC, a consulting firm specializing in transnational crime investigations in Latin America, since 2005. For the last twenty years he worked as a foreign correspondent and investigative journalist at The Washington Post. He is the author of several books and dozens of scientific studies.
**Organized crime, intelligence and terrorism expert. Former Carabineros officer from Chile, researcher in Latin America and author of “A Virus in the Shadow: The Spread of Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime” (2024). He advises the Ministry of Justice and is part of the Chilean government’s Security Advisory Board.
***Originally in political dialogue.
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