“It is very difficult for me to think of an accidental leak. No matter how hard I try, I don’t see how this could happen. the scientist Jose Angel Barasonaresponsible for one of the African swine fever virus vaccine projects ( … PPA), considers as “very improbable” the hypothesis of an accidental leak from the level 3 biosafety laboratory as the cause of the Barcelona epidemic. His opinion is supported by other experts who work or have worked in biosecurity centers of this level and who have been consulted by this newspaper. They agree that food contamination initially considered is a “strong hypothesis” and that the possibility of it being sabotage “is also on the table.”
Last Friday, the Department of Agriculture gave a twist to the scenario of the Collserola crisis (Barcelona) by highlighting the possibility that the origin of the infectious focus was a laboratory, given that a few meters from the place where the first two wild boar carcasses appeared there is one of the reference facilities of biosafety level 3 (BSL3) in Spain, the Animal Health Research Center (IRTA-CReSA)located at one end of the Bellaterra campus of the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB).
“All viruses currently circulating in Member States belong to genetic groups 2 to 28 and not the new genetic group 29 to which the virus causing the outbreak in the province of Barcelona belongs – very similar to genetic group 1 which was circulating in Georgia in 2007-“, the ministry indicated in its note. The genetic virus of group 1 is the virus with which the Spanish biosafety level 3 reference laboratories are currently working, including the Catalan IRTA, where the alleged leak is concentrated. “Viruses, in natural conditions, when they spread through infection cycles in animals, undergo more or less modifications in their genome. The discovery of a virus similar to the one circulating in Georgia therefore does not exclude that its origin could be in a biological containment facility,” the ministry said in its note, in which did not exclude other possibilities as the probable origin of the infection.
However, scientists and animal health experts consulted by ABC who have worked at these facilities for years agree that with the information currently available, “it is difficult” to think of an accidental escape of this virus from a high biosecurity laboratory. “It is very unlikely but not impossible because zero risk does not exist,” they emphasize. They also regret that these facilities are being targeted while “the final result of the comparative genomic analyzes between the strain found and that used in the laboratories is not yet available”.
“The security measures are so extreme in these facilities that I don’t see how a virus that is not airborne can escape. Everything is video surveillance, We constantly take showers with double soaping, constant changes of PPE equipment and we have to practice a multitude of biosafety protocols before carrying out any procedure”, says the scientist in statements to ABC and highlights food contamination, reported at the start of the crisis, as “a serious possibility”. His opinion has the value of his experience since he has been working for almost a decade in a Biosafety Level 3 (BSL3) laboratory in Madrid, precisely with this disease.
“There is no zero risk. “The possibility of an accidental leak is not impossible but it is low based on current data.”
Jose Angel Barasona
Coordinator of the Immunology and Viral Medicine Department of the Veterinary Health Surveillance Center (Visavet)
“The swine fever virus is fast and relentless when it enters the bloodstream; effectively colonizes all tissues “But transmission is slow, unless animals come into direct contact with the blood or mucous membranes of the infected animal.” Although he acknowledges that “there is no zero risk,” the possibility of an “accidental leak” is remote with the data we currently have.
The emeritus professor of animal health at the Faculty of Veterinary Medicine of the University of Zaragoza expresses the same meaning: Juan José Badiolaexpert responsible for the investigation in Spain into the “mad cow” crisis in the 1990s. Badiola, who works in a level 3 biosafety laboratory on the Zaragoza university campus, also considers improbable “but not impossible” the theory that the target came from a laboratory in Barcelona.
He assures in statements to ABC that the origin of the infection will not be known until the various commissions investigating the epidemic have completed their work. Another determining factor will be, and he agrees with his colleagues, “the result of the genomic analysis”. “We will know exactly how similar it is to Georgia 2007, strain with which the laboratories work and which does not circulate outside them, the strain which was identified in the wild boars of Barcelona.
“The security of these facilities was even designed so that we could fail and the system does not allow that”
Antoni Trilla
Epidemiologist at Hospital Clínic de Barcelona
The epidemiologist of the Hospital Clínic, Antoni Trillaalso shares the thesis that “it is very difficult that it was an accidental escape”. “The security system at these facilities is designed to correct any human error. It is even designed in such a way that we can make mistakes and the system does not allow that,” says Trilla. “Even so, he asserts, zero risk does not exist: incidents, although unlikely, cannot be ruled out.” Like his colleagues, he mentions sabotage as another hypothetical possibility. “We must also consider the deliberate introduction of the virus (sabotage), a very low probability possibility but this requires investigation by the relevant authorities. And, finally, the existence of a spontaneous mutation and the natural arrival of the virus in Barcelona by any means, without connection with any laboratory,” explains Trilla.
“Biosafety level 3 involves extremely strict controls: aerosol and secretion controlpersonnel protection protocols, restricted and controlled access, rigorous decontamination protocols, safe management of carcasses and waste and an absolute ban on the consumption of pork products in the facilities,” explains the Catalan epidemiologist.
“For now, they are all the hypotheses. It is one thing to say that it does not resemble the strains that circulate in countries where there is more or less veterinary control, but perhaps it circulates in other countries where there is less control,” explains Antoni Trilla. Barasona supports the thesis. “There is greater control and surveillance of the evolution of the original Georgia 2007 strain in the western part of Europe than in the eastern part. Who tells us that the new genetic group 29 is not circulating in these countries? country ? “Everything remains to be seen,” conclude the scientists.
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