The General Sinicatura of the Nation (SIGEN) has completed an audit that seriously questions the company’s operations PROCREATE II in 2021 to 2023, a period in which the program was dependent on the Ministry of Territorial Development and Habitat – first led by Jorge Ferraresi and then for Santiago Maggiotti, during the government of Alberto Fernandez– and was finally dismantled afterwards Decree 70/2025, signed by the President Javier Milei and from the Minister of Economic Affairs Luis Caputo. The document, which runs to more than 200 pages, shows that the country’s largest housing program has been in operation for years without minimal controls Ensuring transparency, traceability, recovery and correct use of public funds.
The conclusion of the organism is succinctly: “The tasks were carried out within a framework that has vulnerabilities… It is necessary to intensify the adoption of necessary measures to eliminate the identified vulnerabilities.” Translated: A program that managed billions of pesos and was intended to give thousands of families access to their first property cooperated Improvised processes, lack of controls and inconsistent databases.
In November 2024, the government issued Decree 1018/2024, which dissolved the public trust fund that managed the administration WITNESSES. In 2025, by Decree 70/2025 the Secretariat for Territorial Development, Habitat and Housing –the dependence of the state that administered PROCREATE II and other housing programs – as part of a restructuring sponsored by Advances in freedom from the Pink house.
Since this decision, most housing funds and programs have depended on this secretariat were repealed and their functions were reassigned.
According to official information and orders, the reasons for the closure are clear PROCREATE II and dismantle its structure were the following:
- State housing construction and public financing of housing projects would no longer be a state priority, but housing construction would have to be managed primarily by citizens Provinces, municipalities or the private sector.
- The trust funds that administered these programs were considered “agents”a burden on public finances”in particular after control problems, irregularities, delivery delays, lack of results and deficiencies in execution have been identified.
- A philosophy of state reorganization was also mentioned: reducing the size of the state apparatus, Eliminate duplication, centralize (or simplify) functions and prevent direct government intervention in housing.
The governor of Buenos Aires Axel Kicillof He was one of the first to question the housing plan closure announcement. At the same time, he pointed out that the measure implied a blow to housing policies that promoted access to home ownership.
He WITNESSES (Argentine Bicentennial Loan Program for Single-Family Homes) was created on June 12, 2012through the Decree 902/2012signed by Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.
This decree provided for the creation of the PROCREAR Trust Fund and noted that it would be managed by the Banco Hipotecario SA as a trustee with the aim of granting affordable mortgage loans for construction, house purchases and urban development.
The audit goes to the heart of the program. The previous Secretariat for Territorial Development – under Ferraresi and Maggiotti – was responsible for planning, assessing, supervising the work and controlling the use of funds, but SIGEN recognized this There were no procedural manuals, There were no integrated systems, Databases had duplicates and inconsistencies and they were approved Payouts without technical analysis. The National Directorate of Housing was operating no uniform criteria And without documentary traceability.
This is one of the most serious findings There was no personal review of the work. SIGEN said it with surgical precision: “There would be no beneficiary verification policy…”. And about the payouts: “Documentary verification of progress up to 100% by Banco Hipotecario SA”. That means, The work was approved without going to work.
When SIGEN decided to do what the program never did, my suspicions were confirmed: 79 houses inspected, 4 didn’t have a jobseveral were uninhabited and in others Gas meters had never been installed even though they were listed as installed.
Add to that Failures in computer systemswith bases not communicating with each other, duplicate records, and disbursements that did not match declared progress. They didn’t exist either Counterchecks between awards, work and payments. The physical and digital archive was messywith incomplete or lost files and documents without an electronic signature.
The timeline shows how these errors consolidated. PROCREATE II It will be reborn in 2020. In 2021, thousands of loans will be delivered under Ferraresi and irregularities are already beginning to appear. In 2022 Agreement with UTN for $27.6 millionwhich SIGEN will then take into account unfulfilled. This year more than $10.8 billion in mandatory insuranceone of the strongest financial observations. After Maggiotti’s arrival Vulnerabilities have not been fixed.
Between 2022 and 2023 the standard explodes: 41.13% in the “Improvement” row. And 58.14% in “renovation”with delays of up to 2,066 days. The unpaid amount exceeds $3.97 billion. The mortgage lender admitted that it does not carry out active procedures in some lines “unless the customer has other products in arrears”.
Then the most critical episode comes: between September and November 2023 2,500 mortgage loan at zero interest without budget forecast. The state only releases them 30% initially and then leave all the work to him paralyzed. The Secretariat is trying to convert them into personal loans.
On a financial level, the trust took out insurance $10,840,632,505 without coercionwith Caruso Seguros and Hipotecario Seguros. And the agreement with UTN, e.g $27,678,000practical didn’t deliver anything more than a partial pension.
In 2024 SIGEN It conducted its in-person reviews – the first in the program’s entire history – and found serious irregularities. In the same year the ministry was dissolved and many observations were classified “not adjustable” because the carrier no longer existed. Months later, in 2025, the final report was published.
In this context, the audit lists the most significant irregularities that reveal an extensive program based on a weakened institutional structure.
1) All work was approved only with the documents submitted by the beneficiaries.
2) Non-existent works: Nothing was done in 4 of the 79 homes inspected.
3) Critical Failure: 41.13% for “Improvement” and 58.14% for “Repair”, with delays of more than 2,000 days.
4) Mortgage loan without funds: 2,500 families were left with their factories paralyzed.
5) Uncertified insurance for more than $10.8 billion.
6) UTN contract without benefits: $27.6 million for manuals that were never published.
7) Databases with serious deficiencies: Duplicate data sets and systems without integration.
8) Selection of beneficiaries without uniform criteria: Risk of discretion.
9) Poor oversight of urban developments: incomplete reports and unwarranted delays.
10) Messy Physical and Digital File: Lost files and documents without an electronic signature.
Overall, SIGEN observed $14,838,662,466.25between unpaid fees, uncertified insurance and unfulfilled agreements. And he warned that the lack of controls and the elimination of the implementing agency leaves large areas of the program unaddressed without possibility of verification or regulation.
The audit ultimately shows that PROCREAR II was a program with enormous social impact, supported by a weak administrative structure, inconsistent data and minimal controls. A crucial housing policy that, according to SIGEN, has been implemented for years in a “Framework of weaknesses” This endangers the financial integrity of the state and the situation of thousands of families.
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