Yemen ahonda su fracture. Since the Houthi rebels took power in Sanaa in late 2014 and in Saudi Arabia, with the support of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), I intervened militarily in favor of the legitimate government, political, economic and social divisions have deepened. The Saudi coalition’s cessation of hostilities in March 2022 froze the war front: while the uprisings controlled the northwest of the territory, where thirds of its 40 million people live, and left the capital, the rest remained under a diverse anti-Huthi coalition based in the port city of Aden and with the aim of reunifying the country. Until now.
With the only repercussions in the Western press, the secessionists of southern Yemen, part of the anti-Huthi blockade, broke away at the beginning of December by taking control of the eastern provinces of Hadramawt and Mahra. These are two strategic regions for the hydrocarbon deposits of the first (80% of the country’s crude reserves) and for the border with Oman in the second. Immediately, the head of the Presidential Council and prime minister of the internationally recognized government abandoned Adén in the direction of Saudi Arabia, allowing the Consejo de Transición del Sur (CTS), the main separatist group, to place its flag at the presidential headquarters.
This progress demonstrates its intention to declare its independence. For some analysts, the STC has concluded that if it can unify its leadership base and isolate the Houthis, hydrocarbon revenues will help create a viable state. Now its leader, General Aidarus al Zubaidi, is seeking Western support with the argument that South Yemen “shares (its) values and rejects terrorism”, while accusing the government of having abandoned its efforts to recover Saná. Meanwhile, former Foreign Minister Khaled Alyemani is seeking White House sympathy with articles that defend the strategic value to Washington of an independent South Yemen (“helping secure a vital waterway without requiring the presence of U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf”) and is willing to adhere to the Abraham Accords.
The secessionist vocation of a large part of southern Yemen is not new. Despite the union in May 1990 of the Marxist republic that governed the south with what is known as North Yemen, the integration did not work. This failure led to a civil war four years later and a fierce repression of the Sureño movement by the regime of Ali Abdalá Saleh in the following decades. Sureños, who have lived in their own country since the end of the British mandate in 1967, feel treated like second-class citizens. The STC managed to control almost the entire territory of the now-defunct South Yemen Democratic Republic.
The question is why now. Internal and regional reasons overlap. The CTS, financed and armed by the United Arab Emirates, justified its offensive in Hadhramaut by deploying troops near the oil fields of a local tribal leader, supported by Saudi Arabia, where he took refuge after the incident. It is unlikely that Al Zubaidi would attack a Saudi-allied force without the proper visa from its benefactor emirates.
In Yemen, as in Sudan, Abu Dhabi competes for influence with Riyadh and it is no secret that it is seeking, with the mediation of Oman, an agreement with the Houthis to escape this warning, which the separatist advance makes difficult. Both announced negotiations to reduce tensions, but what happened turns their competence into hostility. The STC gave the emirates a chance to exert more influence on the political future of the country. The game is always dangerous. If an agreement is not reached or local citizens (who have already faced and created difficulties in their interests) have doubts, it is more likely that independence will face a new war in one of the poorest countries in the world.
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