The Deputy Emergency Director confirms that no one warned Sekopi of Buyo and points to Pradas for the late alert

The long-awaited announcement Jorge Suarez Before the Dana judge on Thursday, he cleared doubts about the development of Sekopi on the afternoon of Dana, which left 230 people dead.

He noted with his clarifications Ineffectiveness of the device Who addressed the state of emergency and Delay in sending the alert Due to the differences in discussions and the lack of decisions by the advisor at that time, Salome Pradas.

And also because of the lack of information that Sikubi had, as he explained, No one warned about the flood of the Puyo Valley -Neither the Jokar Hydrographic Union (CHJ)- Calls from 112 did not arrive About the tragic situation in the province of Valencia.

Suarez was the highest-ranking official involved in managing the emergency on Dana afternoon and has decades of experience in this field. There is no doubt that his testimony as a witness is one of the most important in the case. In fact, this was suspended after more than 7 hours and will be resumed in a few days.

The chronology of events and details he presents help sketch out what happened at Cecopi and the role played by the members who mattered most on that fateful day.

At the beginning of the meeting at five o’clock in the evening, he explained the situation Hotel RekinaThere were “people on roofs” and they saw “UME resources and forest firefighters couldn’t reach them.”

in 17:15 Already uploaded Use Es-Alert For people trapped in that area It is not known if he used this name.. He said they have the ability to send a notification to all mobile phones.

From that moment, a series of discussions began that led to the alert being sent at 8:11 p.m., three hours later, for the entire province of Valencia.

He noted that after that, members of the military emergency unit and the chief firefighter began to deliver the speech. Jose Miguel Basset. Both reported difficulties getting to Utiel-Requena.

At the same time, President of the Jokar Hydrographic Union (CHJ), Miguel PoloI informed them of the situation Vrata DamWho started pouring water and did not rule out that it would become a failure scenario.

around 17:38Inmaculada Pyles (Head of the Emergency Service) gave him a WhatsApp About the municipalities affected by the Euphrates Dam, and another official sent them the emergency plan for the aforementioned infrastructure. According to this information, there were towns whose height was 6 or 7 meters in the event of a break.

“There they say we have to warn the residents.”noted Suarez, who again brought to the table that Es-Alert could be used though He doesn’t know again if he said the word. He emphasized that Polo also spoke about the need to send a message to residents. That was when 17:45.

He noted at the time that he had handwritten notes from that day in which he stated that he had sent a very basic message that said: “Due to the evolving situation, it is recommended to reach high areas and remain alert.”

It must be remembered that sending the alert did not include a warning against climbing to floors or high areas, but only To avoid displacement. Something that happened due to the controversy that sparked everything related to Es-Alert.

Warning and warning to mayors

The first was panic. Suarez emphasized that when he proposes the letter to both Autilus and Frata (i.e. for the Magro River region), “They have to be careful about causing panic,” Basit said. And he wants experts to verify the authenticity of the message content.

This happened around 6:00 pm. Or 6:05 p.m., according to the deputy emergency manager. He said: And there he is When ex advisor Salome Pradas indicated that they should consider different options and Cecopi was cut off electronically (video and audio, although the video conference was maintained)which was reconnected again around 7:00 p.m.

Meanwhile, Suarez said he would start preparing the notice Juan Ramon Cuevas (head of the analysis unit) was ordered to begin. He said that everything was so Focus on the impact of Vorata Dam They began trying to contact mayors in the region.

Cecopi celebrated the afternoon of Aldana. any

Cecopi celebrated the afternoon of Aldana. any

The Deputy Emergency Director confirmed, He had no “support” Of those who were in Sicope for that letter and “no one said anything” except Mr. Basset, “who said he did not like it.”

In any case, the word metadata is about The first draft of the message was at 6:15 p.m.. Accordingly, At 7:05 p.m., a message had already been uploaded to the platform.

After giving these orders on the warning about Cecopi’s disconnection, he returned to the conference room, where the second discussion was in progress.

Pradas, Emilio Argueso (former number two in emergency situations), Vicente Mombo (President of the Valencia Provincial Council) and Alberto Martín Moratella (Director General of Emergency Situations) “They couldn’t see the letter being sent without notifying the mayors first.”.

On previous occasions, they said, they had tensions with city councils over an episode of fires during Fox’s tenure at State General and did not want to repeat it.

Legal and linguistic discussion

At 7:00 pm or 7:00 pm Cecopi’s second session began then third debate: Legal. First draft of the thesis – Contrary to what Suarez indicated in his notes at the beginning of Secopi – it contained In order to stay at home and not climb to high areas. Pradas believes that this wording can cause problems by being interpreted as confinement.

The former chancellor tried to make legal inquiries about the message – which coincided with some calls to the presidential team – and when she returned to the room, at around 7:30 p.m., Suarez explained that they had not returned.“We are talking not only about Vorata, but about the general situation in the province.” Due to road flooding and bridge problems.

“Here the goal of the message changes, which should no longer be limited to Valencia,” he noted. So the alert text was changed again –“Avoid any movement”-And It was expanded at the provincial level to Valencia.

actually Pradas then gave the green light. They will be 19:45. the advisorSuarez commented, saying: He insisted that everyone agree on Secubi.

the next, Another discussion started and it was about language (Spanish, Valencian, English…). As for ValenciaPradas – with Vicente Mombo- “He made things change because of language issues, accents, etc.” among them, Remove the accent from “València”, change “tipus” to “tipo” and “aquest” to “este”.

After all this, the first electronic alert was finally sent at 8:11 p.m., when there had already been several deaths. In contrast to this, the second, at 8:57 p.m., ordered people to go to the upper floors.

Point to Pradas and Bassett

After this story, Suarez was asked whether this delay was due to “technical or political” problems. “We technicians were clear about this,” he concluded.

But he added that they do not have “the ability to press a button and transmit.” He added, “The measures to protect residents are consistent with the direction of the plan or the firefighting operations command.” Referring to Pradas and Bassett.

He explained that the advisor was “the one who led the emergency management” and he was the one who “decided.” He added: “He indicated at all times that he wanted to see the message.”

The Deputy Emergency Director was also asked what information reached Sekopi that day to make the decision.

As he explained, There was no warning at any time that the Puyo Valley would floodwhich causes most deaths.

YesUárez commented on thisJokar Hydrographic Consortium (CHJ) He did not talk about the valleys. “It was not until seven o’clock in the evening that we learned of the existence of Masanasa or Bayporta/Pecania. There was talk of municipalities, not of canals or valleys. It didn’t say “Boyo Rambla is flooding”It was said that there were floods.

It is famous CHJ email at 6:43 p.m -Who warned of the brutal rise in Puyo flow-We didn’t even have a call or notification or anything.“Suarez said.

He wondered whether the CHJ could not assess the real situation, given the scarce rainfall data from the State Meteorological Agency (Aemet) and the absence of information, and explained that Aemet in Cecopi did not provide rainfall data.

It came from CHJ, but if it is not analysed, it will be limited information. He considered that “Emmett only offers us the development of the phenomenon and overcoming the warnings.”

According to Suarez, head of the government organization, Miguel Polo, Throughout the entire meeting I focused on the Vorata Dam “And then, when it got out there at some point, I stepped in to influence the message regionally.”

Who was to analyze the data to assess the risks? Although he was ambiguous at times about the matter – some accusations pointed to his responsibility Juan Ramon Cuevasthe head of the analysis unit who will have to testify again soon – Suarez ended up saying that “Hydrological analysis is consistent with CHJ.” And it “just” comes from there.

“The vulnerability is channel-based, and we don’t have that knowledge about that,” he said.

The last data they received from Puyo was at 4:13 p.m. With reduced flow and until 6:43 p.m. They didn’t have anything more, he remembers.

When asked what they could have done if they had information, he indicated that they would have done so “Don’t you just see Forata in Cecopi”. ‘Further action could have been taken’Comment.

SAIH and firefighters

Suarez commented on this Emergencies have not reviewed the SAIH website. Because it is general information for the population but should not be interpreted. “Our relationship with CHJ is always through emails or calls, not with SAIH.”He insisted.

As for Valley monitoringThey noted that they sent firefighters because they had “knowledge of hydrography and valleys” and knew “important bridges from experience in other similar situations.”

He added that the observation points were chosen due to rainfall and did not specify a time horizon for the work of firefighters. He said that when the firefighters left, like previous witnesses, they did not report to 911..

Suarez stressed this I was not aware of the size of 112 calls (18,000 received). He explained that the emergency room received information from No. 112 about rescue cases and floods. “He was not able to analyze all the cases.”.

He admitted that all this did not reach Sikubi. He added that no one asked or cared. A lawyer asked him if there were members of Sekopi who could provide information. The Deputy Emergency Director responded that they did not say anything and that they “collapsed,” which he “later found out.”