At a time when the US policy towards India has clearly become punitivethe warm welcome of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi by the Russian President, Vladimir Putinin New Delhi last week was overwhelming. Modi’s message was clear: India is a sovereign power that will not be pressured to take sides in a growing divide between “the West and the rest.” Instead, it will continue to chart its own course in international affairs.
No major power is more important to America’s long-term strategic interests than India. After all, it is the only country with the population, geographic location and military power (including nuclear weapons) necessary to counter China’s efforts to dominate Asia and ultimately dominate China. Replace the United States as the world’s hegemonic power.
Since the presidency of George W. Bush, senior US officials have recognized the alliance with India crucial to maintaining a balance of power stable in the Indo-Pacific. This was never mere rhetoric: Over the past decade, U.S.-India security ties have rapidly deepened, particularly in terms of military interoperability, intelligence cooperation, and technology sharing.
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Some of this progress came during US President Donald Trump’s first term. As pressure on China increased and security assistance to Pakistan was cut, Trump expanded cooperation with Indiawhich was at the heart of his administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy. The result is obvious today: India now conducts more military exercises with the US than with any other country, and the US has become India’s largest trading partner.
But even as this process unfolded, the US gave India plenty of reasons to be cautious. Be Chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan — which took place during Joe Biden’s presidency but was the result of an agreement struck earlier by Trump — raised serious questions about the judgment and reliability of American leaders as, in practice gave this country back to the Taliban terrorists.
Concerns were heightened in 2022 when the government of Biden helped Pakistan He called for a bailout from the International Monetary Fund and then approved a $450 million deal to modernize the country’s U.S.-supplied F-16 fleet, raising bitter memories in India of the supply of U.S. weapons to Pakistan during the Cold War. Trump has intensified this embrace of Pakistanparticularly in the interest of personal enrichment, highlighted by a lucrative cryptocurrency business signed in April.

Although the United States often ignored India’s own interests and expected complete loyalty when it comes to imposing sanctions on Russia over its large-scale invasion of Ukraine. But India, like other American allies like Israel and Turkey, refused to comply and instead increased Russian oil purchases with discount. India saw no reason to sacrifice its national interests for a distant conflict, especially since China was the main beneficiary of Western pressure on Russia.
India has already experienced this dynamic. When Trump re-imposed tough sanctions on Iran in 2019India was deprived of one of its cheapest and most reliable sources of energy, while China seized the opportunity to import Iranian crude oil at deep discounts and expand its presence in the country.
A similar pattern emerged after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. By isolating Russia from Western markets, the sanctions made China Russia’s economic lifeline and gave it the opportunity to strengthen its land energy supply routes from Russia. China now knows that it will not lose access to Russian energy even if it takes action against Taiwan. While this trend undoubtedly undermines India’s strategic interests, At least this time, the country also took advantage of discounts on Russian oil.
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However, the Trump administration refused to be defeated. He imposed one 25% additional tariff on US imports from India (increasing overall tariffs to 50%) and threatened secondary sanctions on the grounds that India had done so Undermining U.S. efforts to counter “Russia’s harmful activities.”. However, Trump has exempted other major importers of Russian energy and even granted sanctions relief to Hungary, whose autocratic Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is a close Trump ally. US tariffs on Indian goods now exceed those on Chinese exports. This is nothing less than a Economic war of the United States against India.
The United States considers India indispensable, but treats your interests as secondary. They want India to be a pillar of their Indo-Pacific strategy, but they are pursuing policies that directly undermine their economic power, regional security and strategic autonomy. Trump’s foreign policy may be particularly unpredictable, but the underlying pattern has extended across multiple administrations. The result is a India is becoming increasingly angry and suspiciousthat sees no other option than to cover its risks by accelerating its self-sufficiency and strengthening its connections alternative partners, starting with Russia.
The Putin’s visit to New Delhi should serve as a warning to the United States: coercion and inconsistency are a sure path to alienation. A flexible, interest-based “soft alliance” with India remains one of the US’s few credible means of countering China’s aggressive rise. In this sense, America needs India more than India needs America. Instead of trying to force India to “accommodate,” the United States should rebuild the relationship by treating India as an equal partner. That means dealing with India as it is, not as American politicians want it to be.
* Brahma Chellaney, Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of Water, Peace and War: Addressing the Global Water Crisis (Rowman & Littlefield, 2013).
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2025.
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