It was announced by the BCRA Presidency that the official strategy for 2026 aims to accumulate reserves through the financial or capital account rather than the current account, following similar experiences to those in Chile and Brazil following their respective stabilization processes. In these cases, capital inflows and the normalization of external financing were key to rebuilding international reserves. The central question is whether this path is viable for Argentina, at least today.
Looking at the BCRA foreign exchange balance, External Asset Formation (FAE) – defined as “the purchase of banknotes and currencies from the non-financial private sector without specific allocation” – continues to be the most important factor of production within the capital account. In the first ten months of 2025, after the opening of supplies to individuals in April, purchases of banknotes and foreign currencies by residents reached $29,929 million, the highest level since the exit from convertibility. Without a significant reduction in FAE, in an economy without exchange controls, it is difficult for the financial balance sheet to contribute net dollars to the BCRA next year.
Foreign direct investments (FDI) and in particular the projects provided for in the RIGI – the special regulation for large investments – also show no signs of an upswing. In 2024, foreign direct investment contributed only $89 million, and in the first ten months of 2025 it even had a negative balance of $1,624 million. This exit is partly due to the transfer of foreign companies to local corporations.
Portfolio investment is a flow that is very sensitive to risks and regime changes. Between 2003 and 2015, it generated virtually no net income and remained mostly in neutral or negative territory. The only relevant exception was 2016-2017, when financial normalization, the abolition of exchange controls and the return to the international market enabled revenues of more than $12 billion before the 2018 crisis reversed this trend. Without a structural change in country risk and the stability of the exchange rate regime, it is unlikely that this channel will again play as significant a role as it did in this exceptional window.
Another key factor is international organizations, especially the IMF. In 2024 and 2025, they explained a large part of the capital account’s positive net income. While 2024 was a year of net payments – with expenses close to $1,100 million – the momentum was reversed in 2025 thanks to extraordinary payouts that exceeded $19,582 million after an agreement was reached in April this year. However, the organizations have already expected that the scope for new disbursements will be more limited and will depend on the fulfillment of fiscal and monetary targets and the progress of reforms. In summary, while this type of financing can still be a relevant support, it is unlikely to reach the scale observed in 2025. Consequently, the new government will need the rest of the financial account – corporate, investment and private flows – to function independently of international organizations.
Corporate debt contributed significantly at nearly $18 billion in 2024 and 2025, mainly from the energy, mining, export sector and banks with access to international financing. This inflow made it possible to partially offset the outflow associated with the FAE and the weakness in portfolio investments. Nevertheless, many of these companies have already experienced intense debt cycles – particularly in capital-intensive projects such as Vaca Muerta or the lithium industry – and will therefore have to start repaying their obligations with their own foreign currency production from now on.
In summary, the question is whether the Treasury needs to increase its own external debt to allow the BCRA to accumulate reserves, especially if the FAE is not reduced and private flows do not improve. In a less optimistic scenario, the accumulation of reserves through the treasury account in 2026 will depend on the Treasury’s ability to place net debt on international markets.
The possibility of the BCRA accumulating reserves through the treasury account in 2026 first requires a significant decline in external capital formation, the main outflow of foreign currencies in 2024 and 2025. Unless the private outflow of dollars is curbed, even greater access to corporate credit or international organizations will have limited impact. In this case, to strengthen reserves, it would be necessary to increase external debt.
In short: the central bank’s strategy requires not only more capital inflows, but above all also less dollar outflows.
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