Phase 2 of the Gaza plan constitutes the next diplomatic and political battleground for Donald Trump in the Middle East. After a first stage marked by the ceasefire, the release of the living hostages, the partial withdrawal of Israeli troops and the … With the increase in income from humanitarian aid, the project promoted by the United States is now entering a much more complex phase, with more challenges, in which security, political power and reconstruction come together under strict conditions.
The starting point is the creation of a new governance structure for Gaza. The plan provides for creation of a Peace Councila political oversight body chaired by the US president himself and composed of regional and international leaders. This council would serve as a framework for the entire process, with authority over security, civil administration and the political transition in the Gaza Strip. An executive committee would depend on it with direct control functions and the ability to intervene when political blockages or disputes arise between local factions and international interests.
The daily management of Gaza would fall to a Palestinian committee of so-called technocratic profiledesigned as a non-partisan administration in charge of basic services and daily governance. This conception explicitly excludes the terrorist group Hamas from any power structure, a red line for Israel, the United States and Arab countries which condition their involvement on the dismantling of the Islamist group’s military apparatus.
The central element of this Phase 2 is security. To achieve this, the plan envisages the deployment of an International Stabilization Force, under American supervision, with a mandate divided into several stages. Firstly, according to documents shared with the press, it is a question of stabilizing the territory through vast deployments, control of public order and prevention of institutional collapse. At the same time, train the Palestinian police forces to ensure internal security in the medium term. And, at the heart of the system, directing the disarmament of Hamas and other militias, with a permanent verification mechanism that prevents their rearmament.
This demilitarization is an explicit condition for moving forward with the rest of the plan. This includes the dismantling of arsenals, the destruction of tunnel networks and the elimination of the operational capacity of armed factions. Without verifiable progress in this area, there will be no large-scale reconstruction or significant international investment. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf countries have made clear they will not fund reconstruction as long as Hamas retains weapons or military infrastructure.
The calendar is one of the most sensitive points and the one on which we negotiate the most. Phase 2 can be activated even without all the problems of the previous stage having been resolved, such as the return of the body of the last Israeli hostage held in Gaza, Ran Gvili. At the same time, Israel reserves the right to maintain a military presence in key areas, including the “yellow line”, an interior strip from which it controls around half the territory, until the new security framework is fully operational.
The transfer of political power would be gradual and conditional. Initially, effective power would return to technocratic committee under international supervision. Only later, and provided that security and institutional reform requirements are met, can the door be opened to greater participation by the Palestinian Authority through reformed institutions. The plan rules out any reconciliation deal that would grant political legitimacy to Hamas, a position that has sparked tensions with some regional mediators.
Reconstruction, one of the most urgent issues for a population devastated after months of war, is therefore subject to a strict sequence: security, disarmament, civil administration and, only later, massive investments. A partial start of reconstruction is even envisaged in areas considered safe, with strict controls on who can access them to prevent the reestablishment of Hamas structures.
Delicate context
This entire framework is part of a delicate regional context. Iran, the main supporter of Hamas and Hezbollah, continues to be a factor of pressure, as does Lebanon, where the disarmament of Shiite militias is underway. far from complete. In Syria, Israeli strikes continue as Washington tries to avoid a direct escalation. And at the diplomatic level, the composition of the international force and the role of countries like Turkey remain a subject of controversy.
This phase is rather an attempt to impose a political and security order on a devastated territory, through a combination of international supervision, indirect military pressure and economic conditionality. Its success will depend less on the documents signed than on the real capacity to carry out disarmament, maintain security and offer the Palestinians a credible alternative government. For the moment, the plan is moving forward between red lines, mutual distrust and shared certainty that, without structural change in Gaza, the ceasefire will be difficult to hold.
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