Maria Corina Machado maintains that USA intensify pressure on Nicolas Maduroincluding military means, as part of a strategy aimed at forcing his departure from power. He argues that political change Venezuela It was already decided during the elections, … with more than 70% of the votes, and what is lacking is international support to enforce this mandate. He emphasizes that this is not a conventional regime change and argues that the use of force may be necessary to guarantee freedom, democracy and, ultimately, peace, even from his position as a Nobel Prize winner.
At the same time, this marks a distance from the operational decisions of the Trump administration in the field Caribbean. He assures that the Venezuelan opposition does not and will not participate in defining the national security policy of the United States and claims to have no information on possible ground attacks. Its position combines political support for greater international pressure with institutional caution aimed at not interfering in the military decisions of the Washingtonwhile sanctions against Maduro’s entourage and operations against interests linked to his environment intensify, such as the seizure of oil tankers.
The United States helped Machado leave Venezuela after more than a year in hiding. She herself confirmed in Oslo that she had the support of the American government to leave the country and go to Norwaywhere he reappeared publicly on the occasion of the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize. He declined to detail how the departure was arranged to protect those who collaborated, and the Trump administration has not officially explained what that assistance was.
This support is part of a broader offensive by Washington against the Venezuelan regime. Machado attributes a key role to the United States in increasing the cost of keeping Chavismo in power, through sanctions, financial pressure and operations against regime assets. According to his version, this combination of external pressures was decisive both in weakening the government and in making his own departure from the country possible.
Machado assures that he will return to Venezuela and that his intention is to personally bring the Nobel Peace Prize, although he avoids setting dates. He explains that the return will take place when the international negotiations which motivated his departure are concluded and regardless of the date of Maduro’s departure. He insists that it is a political commitment and not a negotiation with the regime, even if it is recognized that the risk of arrest remains high.
Machado attributes a key role to the United States in increasing the cost of keeping Chavismo in power, through sanctions, financial pressure and operations against regime assets.
In this context, one of the options discussed is that before returning, stop in Washington maintain political contacts amid growing pressure from the Trump administration against Caracasto whom he attributes a decisive role in the weakening of the regime. Trump plans to spend Christmas Florida from the 19th, one option is therefore that the meeting takes place in his mansion in Mar-a-Lago.
If he comes to the United States, it would not be the first time that a Venezuelan opposition leader has been received at the White House. Juan Guaido He visited Washington when he was acting president recognized by the White House and was received with honors by Donald Trump, who invited him to the Oval Office and presented him as the leader of the transition against Maduro.
Visit to the White House in 2005
This wouldn’t be Machado’s first time on this stage either. In May 2005, she was received in the Oval Office by George W. Bushwhen he directed joina civil society organization dedicated to electoral observation and the defense of democratic processes.
This meeting sparked a lively controversy. Sectors of the Democratic Party, notably the deputy Jose Serranocriticized the White House for welcoming an opposition leader even though Hugo Chávez was democratically elected and warned against interference in Venezuela’s internal affairs. From Caracas, the Chavista government described the meeting as a provocation and an attempt to legitimize a political alternative supported by Washington.
The controversy was aggravated by the financing of Súmate with funds from the organization National Fund for Democracylinked to the US Congress, and by Chavismo’s accusations regarding Machado’s statements during the 2002 coup. For the Venezuelan government and critical analysts, the meeting confirmed that Súmate was acting as an instrument of US foreign policy. The Bush administration defended the meeting as part of its usual support for pro-democracy activists and denied that it involved electoral support or plans for regime change in the country.
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