From a narrative point of view, Lula received a gift from the United States with the end of sanctions against Alexandre de Moraes, which should give him a significant political advantage at the start of the year. On the other hand, he will have to demonstrate a great capacity to face the political cost of government, especially in an election year, in which the interlocutors have their own agendas and interests.
The House and Senate approved the so-called Dosimetry PL project, which changes the way sanctions are applied to those convicted of the January 8 attacks. In the Senate, the proposal was adopted by 48 votes to 25 and reduces the penalties by preventing, in certain cases, the sum of crimes such as coups d’état and the violent abolition of the democratic rule of law, in addition to providing reductions for those who did not organize or finance the acts. Lula has already vetoed it, and if he does, Congress could still overturn the decision.
In plenary, the project is described as a “correction of excesses” by some and a “shortcut to impunity” by others. In the more than 100,000 public WhatsApp and Telegram groups monitored in real time by Palver, among the messages that take a stance on dosimetry, around 86% advocate reduced sentences, almost always alleging “persecution” and “justice,” with calls for “amnesty.” The rejection of the measure, close to 14%, seems anchored in the slogan “no amnesty” and in the idea that the reduction of sentences normalizes the attempt at institutional rupture.
The government’s confrontation with Congress increases the political cost of negotiations, a price that will rise even further in election year 2026. Furthermore, any movement must take into account the fact that, to be able to govern in a future term, Lula depends on the construction of a more aligned Senate. The opposition knows this too, which increases the pressure for the political approach to be proven correct.
If the national scenario contains challenges, foreign policy does not alleviate them either, and the president must manage the tension between Washington and Caracas. In December, the United States stepped up operations in the Caribbean and began intercepting oil tankers leaving Venezuela, part of a strategy the Trump administration describes as a blockade of oil trade linked to Nicolas Maduro’s regime. From the Venezuelan side came accusations of “hacking” and promises to take the dispute to international forums.
In this context, Lula has a rare opportunity to build bridges and become an interlocutor in a conflict that involves oil, migration and democracy. However, if he fails or appears hostage to one party, he loses credibility, which could have an effect on government approval. Foreign policy, which generally produces few electoral results, is a political trap if the failure of negotiations results in war.
Palver’s data shows that among messages that take a position on Venezuela, around 77% react with the vocabulary of “sovereignty” and “imperialism”, targeting the United States; the remaining 23% support Trump and Milei and see Maduro’s fall as a desirable outcome. However, it is important to emphasize that the vast majority do not take a position, but only share headlines, videos and rumors, the perfect scenario for any well-constructed narrative to have a radical impact on public opinion.
The combination of the two agendas will bring a lot to Lula and his team. On the one hand, Congress signals that negotiations in 2026 will be more costly and tense, as sensitive issues become a currency of pressure. On the other hand, the Venezuelan crisis could elevate Brazil to a mediation role it has not played in years, but it could also undermine the popularity of the Lula government. The consequences of decisions taken should not be immediate, but miscalculations on these issues can be very costly from an electoral point of view.
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