In a year of tariffs, threats of use of force in Latin America and sanctions against Brazilian justice ministers, the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) had to recalculate the path of its foreign policy to establish channels of dialogue with the United States of Donald Trump. To do this, he adopted a more discreet stance on sensitive issues of global geopolitics, an area in which the Brazilian president had acted assertively at the start of his mandate, earning him criticism and accusations of bias.
Throughout 2025, Lula avoided expressing categorical positions in the face of large-scale conflicts, such as the war between Russia and Ukraine. This inflection contrasts with the position at the start of his mandate, in which the president tried to relaunch the diplomacy that marked his previous administrations, described as being based on the search for an international protagonist and the strengthening of multilateralism.
Last year, the new global scenario forced Brasilia to abandon part of its ambitions and adopt a more defensive and pragmatic position, according to experts.
The initial strategy came up against a much more restrictive international environment than that of Lula’s first governments, explains Pedro Feliú, professor of international relations at USP. If, in the 2000s, there was room for negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and diplomatic mediation initiatives, today’s world is characterized by the crisis of multilateralism and bipolarization. In this context, it has become more costly to maintain an autonomous foreign policy, particularly vis-à-vis the United States.
This limitation was evident in the successive “no” votes received by Brazil under the current Lula government, says Feliú. The attempt to revive Unasur, a bloc created in 2008 to strengthen relations between South American countries and associated with the left in the region, has made no progress; Ukraine also did not recognize Brasilia as a legitimate mediator of the war; and, even presiding over the UN Security Council, in October 2023, Itamaraty has not achieved a role comparable to that of countries like Turkey, Qatar or the United Arab Emirates, which maintain close relations with the United States and have played a mediating role in major conflicts.
“We saw, from 2023, the failure of attempts to resume the initiatives of the first Lula governments. So there was an adjustment of expectations,” explains Feliú, who coordinates the online platform Polen (Foreign Policy in Figures), with data on Brazilian operations abroad. “Brazil has become much more discreet (on the international scene). This ‘active and proud’ thing? Let’s put that aside.”
In a scenario of international tension unprecedented in recent history, which has created a less cooperative global environment and hindered multilateral forums, Brazil has shifted the international agenda to resolve problems related to Trump’s United States, considered more immediate, explains Guilherme Casarões, associate professor of Brazilian studies at Florida International University.
During 2025, the Lula and Trump governments maintained confidential contacts with the aim of signaling the willingness of both parties to negotiate sensitive points. A few days before the meeting of presidents at the UN General Assembly in September, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mauro Vieira, for example, received a visit from Richard Grenell, Washington’s special envoy for special missions. No documents or public records about the authorities’ agendas have been released.
At the same time, Lula has not received the attention of the international community this year, with his controversial statements on conflicts around the world. At the start of his term, the Brazilian leader received widespread criticism for equalizing the responsibilities of Russia and Ukraine in the conflict, despite the invasion of the neighbor by Vladimir Putin’s forces. In 2024, he even equated Israel’s response to Gaza to Adolf Hitler’s action against the Jews. Tel Aviv is the United States’ largest ally in the Middle East.
Casarãos nevertheless asserts that the Brazilian position was not subservient to the United States. Faced with Trump’s tariffs, he said, Brazil took a “defensive height” to try to protect itself from the world’s greatest power at the worst time in the bilateral relationship in two centuries. According to the professor, the strategy was correct, including contributing to the suspension of Magnitsky sanctions.
Next year, continuing efforts to ease relations with the United States will remain a priority for Lula. As shown LeafAccording to the Brazilian government, the chemistry between the Brazilian president and Trump should not prevent the White House from attempting to interfere in Brazil’s 2026 elections, in the same way that the United States intervened in elections in Argentina and Honduras, for example.
The dialogues will, however, take place in an environment of instability. The new American strategy for the Americas, unveiled at the beginning of September, reaffirms the region as a zone of direct American influence, in a sort of “Trump corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. This creates major challenges given central factors in the PT’s foreign policy, such as Brazil’s trade dependence on China and the anti-American bias that marked part of the governments of Lula and Dilma, according to former Brazilian ambassador to the United States Rubens Barbosa.
This scenario intensifies conflicts of influence in Latin America. According to Rafael Mesquita, professor of international relations at the Federal University of Pernambuco, China is ready to exploit its dominant position in critical chains, such as strategic minerals, to obtain political and economic concessions.
In this environment of competition between great powers, Latin America tends to come under more pressure. And Brazil’s diplomatic room for maneuver is becoming more limited.
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