From all angles, the 2026 elections will be the last dictated by the antagonism between Lulism and Bolsonarism. Lula is entering his final race without having begun to effectively prepare his successor for the next cycle. Jair Bolsonaro left the scene after being convicted and arrested, and his ability to influence the election is unclear.
All research points to several paradoxical data. Even if the erosion of this polarization between Lulism and Bolsonarism is obvious, nothing seems on the horizon to threaten it, nor do the voters seem to know exactly what type of candidate they would like to replace what, according to them, no longer serves them. Given that it rains and it does not rain, it is not surprising that the name of Flávio Bolsonaro is well known, because he brings the pedigree and brings together that fringe of voters who do not see a right disconnected from the former president.
The question is whether the senator from Rio de Janeiro will have the stamina to withstand a campaign that tends to be one of the toughest in recent years, given his own glass ceilings – such as the case of the rachadinhas and their astonishing patrimonial evolution –, the clan as a whole and the emotional and discursive fragility he has shown in previous electoral conflicts.
If the initial momentum fades and the resistance shown so far by the Centrão parties or even by sectors of the economy more loyal to Bolsonarism to a representative of the family on the electoral ballot continues, the possibility that Bolsonaro simply changes his mind and announces another, more acceptable name as his “successor” is not excluded.
In this case, although it has lost its strength, the name that emerges in conversations with political and economic agents continues to be Tarcísio de Freitas. But the margin for the São Paulo governor, who is expected to make the radical decision to resign in April, has been significantly reduced given the way the Bolsonaro family has handled the replacement of the imprisoned leader – emotionally, centrally and without opening discussions to allies.
This image shows the right with a much more disorganized team than the left heading into 2026, even as the government faces a series of obstacles on the way to the final year of Lula’s third term. The real economy is doing well, according to a range of indicators, but this, as I analyzed in my most recent article, runs counter to the immediate start of interest rate cuts, frustrating the government’s hope of counting on stimuli for more growth and more credit during the election year.
Likewise, the main source of market distrust of the PT government, the fiscal issue, remains a point of attention, with the framework leaking everywhere and public spending on the verge of exploding if changes are not made, or at least designed, for the period from 2027 onwards.
This scenario in which both camps arrive with an electorate that is still loyal, but tired, suspicious and without much enthusiasm, announces a campaign in which the use of stories, often detached from reality, will be total.
The right depicts a chaotic Brazil that does not correspond to the data on the improvement of the economic and social situation. He will try to highlight in Lula’s speech one of the most serious real problems afflicting the country, the public security crisis, which is not the primary responsibility of the Union and which requires a less simplistic and much more sophisticated approach, with a real desire to act together between powers and federative entities.
Lula, for his part, will rely as never before on the rhetoric of the father of the poor, with solid programs and achievements to highlight on the platform and in communication. The highlight will be the defense of national sovereignty and Brazil’s noble position on the world stage – for which it actually counted on the decisive help of the desperate Bolsonaro clan.