“There is no worse place to work than the Alemão and Benha complexes, perhaps the most hostile place to work in Brazil.” The speech is represented by Andre Neves, Director of Specialized Police Stations, in a statement to the Public Prosecutor’s Office investigating the operation that took place a month ago, which left 122 people dead. Among these were five police officers. 14 others were shot.
Still, in the words of the researcher, the two compounds located north of Rio de Janeiro are “the heart of the Comando Vermelho.” The situation was very different from 15 years ago, when, in November 2010, the police and armed forces entered the slum clusters without any major difficulties and the criminals fled through the forest or surrendered.
According to experts, there is no simple answer to explain why the work in the two areas connected to the Serra da Misericórdia was so difficult, to the point that the work continued for 17 hours of uninterrupted shooting, as happened last October 28 in the containment operation.
The occupation of Alemão in 2010 is a starting point for this interpretation, because it also represents a symbol of the main political project of the time: the Units of Peaceful Police (UPPs). The project collapsed amid criticism about its transformation into a political platform, its lack of social programs, and it proved economically unsustainable.
“The state government at the time demanded that the scope of the program be expanded beyond the effective capacity of the military police, for electoral political purposes,” notes security analyst Alessandro Vizacro. “In other words, it forced the police to take a step beyond their reach.”
One effect of the UPPs was the migration of members of these armed groups to areas that until then did not have guns, such as the interior of the state and the Lagos area. At the same time, the faction in these locations began adopting practices similar to those followed by the militias in scouting the area.
“The current reality is that both groups seek to consolidate regional hegemony to carry out the same practices there, each in its own way, and to gain as much profit as possible,” says Prosecutor Fabio Gouveia.
According to him, it is also possible to observe an “expansion project” of the main drug trafficking faction in Rio de Janeiro to other locations in Brazil.
Strengthened economically, Red Command purchased more weapons, some of the same model used by the Bope (Special Police Operations Battalion): the AR-10, the forces’ newest rifle, used only by elite snipers.
According to a civilian police intelligence report, estimates from 2023 indicate that CV possessed 926 rifles and 1,236 pistols in these two compounds. According to the institution, the two sects will be centers of command, decision-making, and tactical training.
Regarding territorial control, in 2017, when the YPG became affiliated with the Phalange, a military police report indicated that patrols in and between the streets of Alemão were limited to about 15% of these areas. The rest was a red zone, indicating the possibility of major clashes.
In 2019, with the advent of ADPF 635, which established guidelines to reduce police lethality in communities, the state government began attributing the promotion of human trafficking to the measure imposed by the STF (Federal Supreme Court). With the exception condition, fewer operations are performed, for example. However, according to data from the Attorney General’s Office, from June 2020 to January of this year, Rio de Janeiro’s civil and military police reported carrying out about 4,600 operations in local communities, an average of three operations per day.
For Viscrow, during the epidemic, in conjunction with the anti-drug forces, drug trafficking has strengthened the barricades. From cars, tires and trash, they began using large beams, some of which were electrified.
“Despite any benefits it (the Afghan People’s Defense Forces) may have brought, the fact is that it has contributed to strengthening the territorial control of armed groups within its enclaves,” he analyzes.
There is another aspect, mentioned by a civil police officer, which is the cultural aspect. Red Command has cruelty as its norm, according to an investigator investigating armed groups. Drug dealers who refuse to shoot police officers are allegedly killed.
Edgar Alves, Duca, the 55-year-old leader of Benha, is seen as an example. In his only arrest in 2007, he resisted hours of gunfire and was arrested only when he ran out of ammunition. Luciano Martiniano da Silva, Bizão, 49 years old, leader of Alemão, fled in 2010, also in the operation that took place a month earlier. They have no defense.
Duca and Bizao have been linked to the complex since they were young, and there they promoted the faction through funk dances, graffiti, and launching trends among young people – most recently dyeing their hair red.
According to the police, the two were protected by drug soldiers who ended up dying. In 2010, most of these soldiers were children, some of whom were not yet born.
“The confrontation with the police is a mechanism to reinforce the hierarchy of these criminal factions,” says Vizacro. “The advantage of this criminal is the confrontation.”
On one of its fronts, the government of Claudio Castro announced the Baricada Zero programme. The program envisages removing barriers and preparing communities for a land restoration plan, which will be delivered by the end of the year.