The dissolution of Parliament is an institution that comes from the previous parliamentary system of democracy. It only exists in Europe as a result of the monarchy being the origin of said system. Without the dual configuration of executive power, with a hereditary head of state and an elected head of government, this institution would not have existed.
The solution is an increase in the monarchical principle that has not been put to an end with the imposition of the principle of democratic legitimacy, as should have happened, without this transgression having been justified in a truly democratic foundational debate.
It was not justified because it has no easy justification. The source of democratic legitimacy is the people organized as an electoral body. In the said Electoral College, and not in Parliament, resides the constituent power, from which all constituted powers are derived. Hence, the formula for democratic legitimacy is that “national sovereignty resides in the Spanish people, from whom the state authorities emanate.”
Dissolving Parliament is not a formula for democratic legitimacy. Rather, it is a formula that the Constitution does not resort to unless the House of Representatives is unable, after holding general elections, to install a prime minister within a period of two months. Parliament loses the democratic legitimacy it received directly from the electoral college if it is unable to transfer it to the candidate to head the government. But apart from this assumption, the person who has that legitimacy, the Prime Minister, is the only constitutional body that can take the decision to dissolve Parliament.
The chain of democratic legitimacy works in one way in the upward phase and in the other in the downward phase. In the ascending stage, the order is: Electoral College – House of Representatives – Prime Minister. In the decline phase, it is the opposite: the Prime Minister – the House of Representatives – the Electoral College. This is the arrangement that appears in the Spanish Constitution of 1978, which has only two exceptions: no simple majority vote on a question of confidence (Articles 112 and 114(1) of the European Council) or an absolute majority vote on a censure petition (Articles 113 and 114.2 of the European Council).
The first, the question of confidence presented by the Prime Minister, was Carles Puigdemont’s proposal. The second motion, the motion of censure, was proposed by VOX on two occasions. Between the two was Alberto Nunez Viejo, who continues to pick the flower, but so far he prefers the path of demonstrations, that is, the street in front of the institutions.
After much invocation of the Constitution, it turns out that Alberto Nunez Viejo is the only person who does not want to follow what the Constitution says. Felipe Gonzalez risked a censure motion in 1980, which was unsuccessful. But he tried and even turned to Manuel Fraga Iribarn for support. It is enough to review the discussion of the proposal to see it. The exchange of letters between Felipe Gonzalez and Manuel Fraga was one of the highlights of this debate. The socialist promoter of the movement did not achieve what he sought, but he took a risk.
Pedro Sanchez also took a risk in 2018. It was not at all clear that the censure motion would be approved by an absolute majority, but in the end it was approved. You had to be brave to take the risk.
Alberto Nunez Figo’s risk aversion could not be more surprising. What are you most afraid of? Do you have to present a government program and present it for discussion with all other parliamentary blocs in the House of Representatives, or not obtain an absolute majority?
The second is absolutely flawless. It may end up being the former. The observation session on Wednesday, in which the Prime Minister will face, and after which the other representatives of the parliamentary blocs will face, is not the same as facing everyone alone.
With the Constitution in hand, he has no other alternative.