The recent initiative to move toward a trade and investment agreement between Argentina and the United States must be read beyond the current political enthusiasm. This is neither an exception granted to our country nor a bilateral gesture resulting from the creative negotiations of local diplomacy. What was announced fit, point by point, into a broader strategy that Washington was deploying to reorganize its foreign trade policy: Fewer multilateral scenarios and more bilateral schemes adapted to their economic, technological and geopolitical agendasto.
Since the new presidency of Donald Trump, the United States has been prioritizing tailored, tailored agreements with countries it considers to be strategic or functional partners in its vision of international order. This preference for bilateral frameworks – at the expense of global drivers such as the World Trade Organization – allows it to set rules on sensitive issues, protect its competitiveness and weave the regulatory alliances that accompany its position in areas such as innovation, economic security, and vital value chains. Argentina’s stated framework falls under this conceptual umbrella. A platform of guidelines was developed in Washington and has been provided as a primary basis for several countries, including Casa Rosada.
The joint statement with Argentina almost verbatim repeats other communications the White House recently signed with Thailand, Vietnam, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, El Salvador and Ecuador, among others. FirstlyThe partner countries’ broad commitments to trade liberalization and openness to American investment; second, Promising to negotiate a reciprocal tariff plan, the specific benefits of which are subject to subsequent talks; third, A recurring collection of chapters covering national treatment and non-discrimination, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, digital trade, intellectual property, labor and environmental standards, and components of economic security such as export controls, sensitive investments, and supply chain resilience.
In any case, they are merely frameworks: preliminary documents that establish a series of general political guidelines, but they lack full legal force and do not in themselves constitute enforceable obligations. Rather, it serves as a declaration of intent that sets boundaries, priorities, and guidelines. Under which the real negotiation will take place. It is at this later stage – when the specific chapters are drafted, exceptions are identified, tax exemption schedules are drawn up, and the regulatory scope is determined – that the substantive content of the Convention comes into play.
While this declaration from Buenos Aires was presented as a diplomatic achievement, the document shows that the initiative did not arise from balanced negotiations, but rather from Argentina’s commitment to a pre-designed plan. The National Executive, like other governments that accepted these frameworks, assumed starting points set by the North American Strategy for expanding its economic, technological and regulatory influence. The initial stage is therefore not a table between equals, but rather the acceptance of pre-determined criteria from which only discussions about real benefits, potential costs and effective levels of reciprocity will begin.
The effort to present the Declaration as evidence of the “success” of an official mission or as a political victory for internal consumption makes it difficult to read clearly the true scope of the agreed framework. The challenge is to take the important debate seriously: what is Argentina giving up, what is it getting in return, what are the sectoral impacts, and how much room for maneuver is left to negotiate an agreement that reflects medium- and long-term national interests? What is relevant is to assess whether the conditions proposed by Washington make it possible to preserve policy spaces, protect sensitive sectors and, at the same time, generate real opportunities for international integration. It will also be important to gauge the extent to which Argentina will be able to influence the precise text of the agreement or whether it will be limited to accepting regulatory standards that the United States has already incorporated into other bilateral processes. In the absence of an honest assessment of the costs and benefits, and in the absence of an informed discussion that includes productive actors, experts, and institutional representatives, there is a risk of moving toward an asymmetric settlement that strengthens the United States’ negotiating position. Without necessarily translating into tangible benefits for our country.
Director of Insight 21, Siglo 21 University Research Centre.