The release of the United States National Security Strategy (NSS 2025) in November 2025 marks a turning point in U.S. foreign policy with profound implications for Latin America and Colombia in particular. An analysis by the Colombian-American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham Colombia) offers a technical and neutral view of the strategic guidelines of the NSS 2025, its connection to the so-called “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine and the possible impact on bilateral relations between Colombia and the United States.
NSS 2025 is presented as a “corrective shift in post-Cold War foreign policy” whose central goal is to “restore America’s strength at home and abroad,” prioritizing the protection of territory, population, economy, way of life, and sovereignty over any broader global agenda. The document reinforces the approach America firstwith an emphasis on reindustrialization, energy dominance (oil, gas, coal and nuclear), strict control of migration and reducing critical dependencies on other powers, particularly China.
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In the words of AmCham Colombia: “NSS 2025 declares the central goal of ‘restoring America’s strength at home and abroad’ and ‘ensuring that the United States remains the strongest, wealthiest, and most successful nation in the world'”. The approach implies a redefinition of the American national interest, which now focuses on the protection of territory, population, economy and sovereignty rather than globalist or pro-democracy agendas.
NSS 2025 is articulated with the “Trump Consequence” of the Monroe Doctrine, which redefines the Western Hemisphere as a priority space of leadership and security for the United States, resistant to the intrusion of extra-hemispheric powers and the influence of “globalist institutions.” According to AmCham Colombia, “The Western Hemisphere is a space where the United States claims leadership and resists both the intrusion of extra-hemispheric powers and the influence of ‘globalist institutions’.”
Although it is a political discourse and not a legal norm, this consequence guides Washington’s interpretation of the region and shapes its relations with countries like Colombia. That’s how things are Colombia is “viewed less as a supplier on which the United States depends for its existence, but rather as a reliable source of ‘friendly partners’ in the hemisphere.”
The NSS 2025 sets three global axes:
- Border security and “end of the era of mass migration”.
- Economic security through reindustrialization and reconfiguration of supply chains.
- Maintaining United States technological, energy and military superiority.
The Mass migration is perceived as a threat to social cohesion and the labor market, This strengthens the centrality of the southern border and the Mexico-Central America-Caribbean corridor.
In the economic area, the strategy aims to reduce and promote vulnerability to China Nearshoring And Friend horing towards the Western Hemisphere and use commercial, financial and regulatory instruments as national security tools. According to ECLAC figures, foreign direct investment (FDI) to the region in 2024 was concentrated on:
- Services: 44%.
- Manufacturer: 40%.
- Natural resources:16%.
The investment announcements were led by:
- Hydrocarbons: 37%,
- Extendable: 16%.
- Communication: 10%.
The United States consolidated as the main source of investment in the region (38%), followed by:
- European Union: 15%.
- Latin America and the Caribbean: 12%.
- Canada: 5%.
- China: 2%.
AmCham Colombia identified specific opportunities for the country arising from the NSS 2025. Among these, the use of nearshoring and friendshoring as well as the reconfiguration of supply chains stand out. In this regard, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) estimates. Shifting production to the region could result in additional exports of up to $78 billion per year in the short and medium term ($64 billion in goods and $14 billion in services).
The quick wins They focus on industries such as automotive and auto parts, textiles and clothing, pharmaceuticals and medical devices, electronics and renewable energy components.
This way, Colombia can position itself as a key hub for productive relocation in light and medium manufacturing, business and IT services, and value-added agribusiness. Furthermore, identifying “strategic points and resources” in the Western Hemisphere opens the door for Colombia to propose a prioritized portfolio of strategic assets and corridors, such as: B. Ports in the Caribbean and the Pacific, interoceanic logistics corridors, energy projects as well as fiber optic networks and cybersecurity.
In the mining sector, the NSS 2025 highlights the importance of critical minerals for the energy transition. Colombia has a relevant portfolio of these resources, but about 97% of the territory does not have detailed geological exploration and only a minimal part is protected.
“The main bottleneck is not geological but institutional and regulatory” warns AmCham Colombia, therefore addressing this challenge requires state policy decisions and the structuring of projects with high socio-environmental standards and the participation of US capital.
However, NSS 2025 also presents important challenges:
- Control of chemical precursors and the fight against fentanyl:
Any impression that Colombia is increasing purchases of sensitive precursors or hinting at synthetic production could lead to strong pressure from Washington, aid conditioning, cooperation and even commercial benefits.
In 2025, Colombia signed a cooperation plan under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), cementing China as a major import supplier. However, Asian investments in critical sectors such as infrastructure, energy and telecommunications could be viewed in Washington as inconsistent with the “Trump Conclusion,” creating pressure to review or restrict these projects.
With the U.S. strategy to “end the era of mass migration,” expectations are growing that Colombia will increase controls in the Darien region and participate in programs to return and process asylum seekers, potentially clashing with limited institutional capacity and domestic human rights agendas.
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