It is said that Henry Kissinger, the legendary advisor to North American presidents, said that it was very difficult to reach an agreement with the so-called old continent because he found himself faced with a collection of countries so disintegrated that he ended up asking: “What telephone number should I dial if I want to speak to Europe?”
Something similar is happening in Mexico and this, which may seem anecdotal, is extremely serious for the stability, normal functioning and national security of such a vast, heterogeneous and complex country.
In theory, when a foreigner looks at the map of those who govern, he discovers that there is a head of the federal Executive and 32 people in charge of Mexico City and the state governments, and then a more or less extensive series of what used to be called, with academic formulation, “de facto powers”, less and less factual and more and more intertwined in the formal apparatuses. But real politics is far harsher, savage and crueler than regime apologists and office analysts imagine. In other words: today in Mexico there are so many governing powers that, as a result, no one governs completely.
Let us examine six poles of power in this constellation that political science defines as polyarchy – government of many, as Robert Dahl proposes -, that is to say areas distributed between numerous actors but which, contrary to what the theory proposes, not only does not improve democratic quality by establishing a system of functional checks and balances, but it atomizes it between several agents or groups with contradictory interests, without a vector which reasonably arbitrates them or channels, manages or orders the contradictions.
The first, of course, is the one who formally bears legal responsibility, namely the President of the Republic. But their area is limited because there are other formal powers or informal lordships that control their small or large territories, where trust and loyalty do not exist or are volatile and apparent, but manage the relevant powers and decisions. Many of them are entrenched in the presidential orbit itself – the guardians of the legacy –, in the prefabricated judicial system, in the realms of the legislature, the middle and upper bureaucracy, and in important and lucrative positions in government agencies and corporations. On this map, which looks more like an archipelago than a continent, it does not always appear that the president is actually in control as captain of the ship and, in fact, it sometimes evokes a phrase from a Polish poet: “I know that nothing will justify me as long as I live, for I myself am my own obstacle.” »
The second pole is the official party which, more precisely, is a small group of interests, factions, ambitions, complicities and betrayals. He is frequently exhibited as a hydra, the mythological many-headed serpent that nests in the chambers of deputies and senators, in the remains of the immediate past or in those who cannot find a home, where everyone takes advantage of what they can or tries to board the carousel to enjoy the piñata. Morena has never been an organic party nor a representation of classes, cadres or masses in the traditional sense of the term. It was and still is a crowd more than an organization. It therefore behaves as a diverse combination of opportunism, activism and transfuguism, where everyone manages their own philias, phobias and interests as suits them best.
The third government, conveniently atomized, is that of organized crime. According to a journalistic investigation that examined more than 50 government intelligence reports, it is estimated that there are more than 80 organized criminal groups and approximately 16 criminal gangs in Mexico. For its part, the investigative service of the United States Congress has calculated that this crime controls a third of the national territory (although other sources claim that in 75% of it the presence of at least one group or faction has been recorded), and within which there is a constellation of organizations that compete with each other, dispute matters in a naked way, and where the only law is the one that each imposes in their kingdom.
A fourth sector is clearly made up of the military, marines and national guards among whom discipline is more apparent than real because they do not obey entirely the civilian command but rather their own hierarchy, their exclusive system of justice and their internal codes. As parts of these organizations possibly collude with crime or illicit affairs in the public entities they manage, they then serve several masters at the same time, their own and outside, which for reasons of simple survival and convenience – the “balance of fear” is called in the investigation – gives them protection. To say that the supreme command has absolute control over the intestines of these organs is an understatement.
The next front is made up, in turn, of the state governors, 17 of whom will leave in 2027. Logically, they are today much more than busy and worried about ensuring their departure, settling scores with bad companies, making unspeakable pacts, taking bodies out of the closet and trying to ensure that they do not end up in prison the day after the end of their mandate. This is a group whose loyalty is neither to the law, nor to the president nor to the parties to which they belong, but solely and exclusively to their own physical, patrimonial and legal protection.
And the last factor of power, and perhaps, with crime, the most powerful, is the United States, and it is made up of the agencies responsible for fighting drugs, binational trade, migration and all the critical issues between the two countries, which are neither rare nor simple. On this front, as we have seen, the greatest weight in the decision making The White House has it and will have it, even if Mexican rhetorical nationalism tries to sweeten it for the gallery with a few dollops of sovereignty and patriotism.
In short, who orders in Mexico? In the broad sense, several powers and none at the same time. Meanwhile, the economy is not growing, violence and insecurity persist, political and social tensions are surfacing, and the rule of law is the subject of more than intensive therapy. Although, as Paul Kennedy wryly said, regarding another region, Mexico could perhaps “suddenly improve and wake up next week looking like Denmark”, but it turns out that the chances are very low, if not almost zero.
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