The US blockade against Venezuelan oil tankers aims to cut off growing Chinese influence.

The relationship with China is at the heart of this approach. Most of Venezuelan oil is sold at a discount to Chinese refineries due to sanctions, and Washington understands that this flow supports the regime and, indirectly, opaque financial circuits. The blockade specifically targets routes to China, where many “black fleet” ships operate, with the aim of cutting off revenues, reducing Maduro’s ability to maneuver and limiting the use of Venezuelan oil as political and financial currency against the United States and its allies.

At the White House, the siege is presented as an operation “denial of liquidity”. This is not only to prevent the state oil company from collecting the crude, but also to make it difficult for Venezuelan crude to operate as an asset exploited in parallel markets, with reflagging, transshipments on the high seas and routes designed to dilute the origin. This logic explains why Washington’s attention is now focused on ships and logistics, as much as on intermediaries. Oil, they claim, finances the Chavista regime and its network of allies.

Documents recently released by ABC describe a financial structure created by the Venezuelan government to move resources out of international control. These files detail a circuit in which part of the money entering Venezuela from China ended up benefiting, directly or indirectly, the Iranian state apparatus. A report cited in this documentation estimates 7.821 million dollars (6.659 million euros) the total volume of funds flowing to Iran through this route, including identified transfers and diversions associated with the so-called Sino-Venezuela Fund.

This figure is not based on a single operation. The report maintains that part of the resources of the Sino-Venezuelan Fund (FCCV) have ended up in projects and circuits linked to Tehran through triangulation schemes that include “socialist factory” programs, cost overruns and undelivered services. This same document includes a conservative hypothesis: consider as diverted 5% of the total FCCV, calculated on 62.631 million dollars (53.328 million euros)which would bring in 3.132 million dollars (2.666 million euros) in indirect installment attributable to these flows.

Avoid sanctions

According to Washington, the oil sold to China and associated credits have not only supported Maduro. They also provided a platform to transfer resources and projects to a sanctioned third party. The focus on maritime routes to China and the “black fleet” is no longer just an economic punishment for Caracas, but is now presented as an operation to prevent Venezuelan oil from continuing to function as an exportable financial instrument, with consequences for third countries.

Trump also decided to link the pressure to a demand for restitution. In his message on Tuesday, he announced that he would maintain and expand the fence. “until Venezuela returns to the United States all oil, land and other property previously stolen from us.” This is an explicit reference to the nationalizations of the energy sector and the assets expropriated from American companies during the previous stages of Chavismo. With this formulation, he elevated the conflict from the technical terrain of sanctions and licenses to that of a direct claim of ownership and an alleged historical debt.

When the presidential team was asked on Wednesday what Trump meant by these restitutions, given that there is no record of an expropriation of US territory by Venezuela, the response was articulated by Stephen Millerone of Trumpism’s toughest hawks on national security and immigration.

Miller argued that the Venezuelan oil industry was created with American capital, technology and labor, and that its expropriation constituted a “the greatest theft of American wealth and property ever recorded”. According to his account, these “looted” assets not only supported the Maduro regime, but also served to finance terrorism and fuel drug networks, mercenaries and violence with a direct impact on the internal security of the United States.

The expropriations to which this official refers took place mainly under the governments of Hugo Chavezstarting in the mid-2000s, when Venezuela nationalized large strategic sectors, including crude oil. In this process, the State took control of projects with the participation of large foreign companies, particularly North American ones, with the argument of recovering sovereignty over natural resources. In several cases, partial compensation was granted. In others, disputes have resulted in lengthy international arbitrations. From Washington’s current perspective, these nationalizations resulted in multimillion-dollar losses for U.S.-based companies and marked the deterioration of bilateral relations.

The Trump administration is now looking back on this episode to view the current pressures not only as a sanctions policy. In fact, this includes a claim of assets and an accusation that the resources obtained after these expropriations ended up financing criminal networks and alliances with sanctioned countries like Iran.

Trump further reinforced the political warning, saying that the US military presence in the Caribbean “will only grow” and that the impact on Caracas will be “like nothing they’ve ever seen before.” Given this, House Democrats are forcing votes to limit the president’s use of military force, after Trump warned that ground attacks could occur “soon.”

One of the resolutions, promoted by Gregory Meeksseeks to withdraw the armed forces from any hostility against organizations designated as terrorists in the Western Hemisphere without legislative approval. The second, presented by the Democrat Jim McGovernfocuses specifically on Venezuela and has the support of several Republicans, giving it more options to thrive.

The debate comes after months of attacks on ships that Washington associates with drug trafficking that have left at least 95 dead, and after new signs of escalation. Among them, it is worth highlighting the designation of part of the Maduro regime apparatus as a foreign terrorist organization and the announcement of a total blockade of sanctioned oil tankers. Several lawmakers decried the administration’s failure to explain why it did not consult Congress and questioned whether the real goal went beyond the war on drugs.

Although some Republicans acknowledge that there is sufficient support to authorize military action, they insist that the president must make the formal request. White House and Republican leaders say Trump is acting within his constitutional powers, while the chief of staff, Susie Wilesadmitted that any ground operations would require approval from the Capitol.