Fragmentation and turn to opposition in Latin America

The elections in Chile have reopened a question that preoccupies the region today: is Latin America experiencing an ideological reconfiguration to the right or rather a series of defeats by exhausted governing parties?

The Chilean result is part of a recent electoral calendar that also included elections in Ecuador and Bolivia, while in Peru the political crisis led to a presidential replacement. Even in Honduras, where there is no definitive winner, the main candidates come from right-wing forces.

Although each case responds to specific national dynamics, the common denominator is the emergence of leaderships located in different segments of the conservative arc, from more radical expressions to centrist options.

This reorganization of the regional political map does not seem to be explained simply as a new short-term pendulum swing. On the one hand, indicators suggest that certain ideas associated with conservative ideology are on the rise. According to the Latinobarómetro 2024 survey, conducted on more than 19,000 cases in 18 countries in the region, the level of self-identification with the law reached the highest level in more than two decades.

However, another interpretation focuses on the weakening of the governing parties. In a context characterized by economic stagnation, a sense of insecurity, political fragmentation and ongoing social unrest, voting seems to be associated with rejection rather than programmatic approval.

In this sense, Doctor of International Relations and UNR Professor Esteban Actis defines the regional scenario as a “turn to the opposition”. “There is growing dissatisfaction with those in power in societies, regardless of their political affiliation, whether conservative or progressive,” he claims.

However, the fact that the electoral dynamics are characterized by the rejection of the governing parties does not mean that the political signal of the alternatives is irrelevant. Comparison with the previous conservative political cycle allows us to better assess the specifics of the current scenario. Between 2015 and 2019, the region witnessed the consolidation of right-wing parties with a predominantly liberal or pro-market profile, embodied by leaders such as Mauricio Macri in Argentina, Sebastián Piñera in Chile or Pedro Pablo Kuczynski in Peru, with Jair Bolsonaro representing a more ideological and radical exception.

The current scenario, on the other hand, shows more ideological leadership with explicit ties to the alt-right and greater harmony with Donald Trump’s political project. The return of the former US president to the international stage and his active involvement in Latin America appear to be a key factor in understanding this phase.

Throughout 2025, Trump publicly emphasized the need for consolidation in the region by governments sympathetic to his project, combining supportive gestures with explicit warnings. Statements like “If you lose, we won’t be so generous to Argentina” or his references to Honduras – where he warned that the United States “will not waste its money” in countries ruled by “false leaders” – functioned as political signals towards Latin America.

For Actis, this reorganization cannot be separated from a redefinition of Washington’s regional strategy, in which Latin America once again assumes a central role through a logic of rewards and punishments and is more directly integrated into the US national security vision. “The control of migration flows, the drug trade and, above all, the growing presence of China explain the renewed interest of the United States in the region,” he emphasizes.

In this context, regional integration appears to be more of an obstacle than a goal of these rights. During the conservative turnaround from 2015 to 2019, processes like Unasur were dismantled and other spaces like Celac lost budget and political centrality without solidifying permanent alternatives. Actis recalls that initiatives like Prosur had limited scope and modest results.

When asked about the possibility that the current shift to the right will lead to a new form of regional articulation, the analyst is skeptical. More than just ideological regionalism, he expects a deepening of fragmentation and a crisis of collective action. “National logics will be privileged and multilateral spaces will be weakened,” he warns, in a scenario that reinforces asymmetrical bilateral negotiations.

In the same vein, political scientist and Conicet researcher Daniela Perrotta argues that “the contemporary right not only lacks its own regional narrative, but it often actively delegitimizes the idea of ​​the region,” replacing it with unequal bilateral ties and automatic alignments.

In their view, integration presupposes the existence of common institutions, norms and a certain degree of shared sovereignty that impacts domestic agendas. “What we are seeing today is that right-wing governments, especially the most radicalized ones, are explicitly questioning these pillars,” he emphasizes. The result is a political emptying of regional institutions, which does not always manifest itself in formal withdrawals, but rather in the deactivation of their decision-making capacity.

Perrotta does not rule out that forms of regional coordination could emerge in the short term, but clarifies that these would be agreements based on specific agendas – such as energy, infrastructure or strategic resources. Their limitation, he emphasizes, is that they hardly allow Latin America to be portrayed as a collective actor with greater autonomy in an increasingly fragmented international scenario.

It is therefore not only consolidating through the emergence of a new regional integration under different ideological auspices, but rather a fragmented region in which states retreat to defensive national strategies and have no architecture that articulates a lasting consensus.